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1. SETTING THE SCENE
On Sunday, September 19, 1886, Moses Harman, the editor of the
radical newspaper Lucifer the Light-Bearer, presided over an inherently
contradictory event-a free-love marriage ceremony between his associ-
ate editor, the thirty-seven-year-old Edwin Walker, and Moses' own
daughter, the sixteen-year-old Lillian.
Born in 1830, Moses had been raised as a Methodist. Prior to the
Civil War, he had been a circuit rider and camp-revival preacher, criss-
crossing the Missouri backcountry on horseback, to engage in deadly
spiritual combat with the devil while also winning souls for the Lord
Jesus.2 By the late 1850s, however, he had fallen away from the old-time
religion and moved first to Universalism, that halfway house between
Christianity and pure agnosticism, and finally to a robust materialist
atheism.'
After moving from Missouri to Valley Falls, Kansas, following the
Civil War, Moses became involved in radical politics.4 His newspaper,
Lucifer, not only challenged all religious dogma,' but acquired the repu-
1. Moses Harman, Personal, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Sept. 17, 1886. Although the
publication of the paper is listed as preceding the wedding, the newspaper actually
went to print afterwards, on September 20. See Arrested!, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-
BEARER, Sept. 17, 1886.
2. HARMAN-HARMON GENEALOGY AND BIOGRAPHY: WITH HISTORICAL NOTES, 19 B.C.
TO 1928 A.D., at 105 (John William Harman ed., 1928).
3. I discuss both his conversion to Universalism and his commitment to atheism in
chapter one of my forthcoming biography of Moses Harman, Lucifer's Children: Or,
How America Became a Secular Nation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor).
4. Moses frequently published the work of radical writers like John Swinton, the former
editor of the New York Times, who operated his own paper, known eponymously as
John Swinton's Paper. Lucife/s pages contain sentiments like: "Blast the vampires of
capital, who drain the life-blood of their victims! Blast the greedy monopolists and
corporations, who devour the substance of the poor upon whom they prey!" John
Swinton, Blast the Blasters, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Apr. 18, 1884.
5. In the very first issue of his newspaper, Moses Harman declared as its foremost objec-
tive: "[The] effort to break the chains which have been riveted upon the minds and
souls of men and women by that religion of Fear and Hate, misnamed Christianity."
Prospectus, VALLEY FALLS LIBERAL, Aug. 1880.
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tation of affirmatively supporting anarchism.' Moses denounced vio-
lence most of the time, but he also wrote in praise of dynamite and its
unique effectiveness in promoting political change. He supported the
rights of labor and remained on good terms with socialists and com-
munists even though he did not endorse their views.
In December 1882, Moses added to his newspaper staff the inex-
haustible and combative Edwin Walker.! Walker hailed from Iowa and
had already acquired a considerable reputation in anarchist circles.10 His
articles appeared in the flagship political journal Liberty," published in
Boston and edited by Benjamin Tucker, perhaps the foremost exponent
of libertarian anarchism in the nation.12 Walker, who lived into the
1930s, would, at the end of the nineteenth century, move to New York
City and immerse himself in the free-speech movement of that era,
helping to found the Free Speech League, an early precursor to the
ACLU.13
In the middle 1880s, Walker and Harman made a formidable
combination. Walker brought to the task a truly intense amount of en-
ergy and industry. He frequently embarked on speaking tours that
traversed the central part of the country, from Minnesota to Texas and
6. Harman defended anarchism numerous times in print. See, e.g., Moses Harman,
Reply to Anarchist, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 25, 1885.
7. "Dynamite is the short but strong arm that enables the oppressed and downtrodden
to contend successfully against the long arm of the rich and powerful oppressor. Steel
and Gunpowder have long ruled the world. The day of their triumph has passed-
the day of Dynamite is at hand. All hail Dynamite, the poor man's friend!" Moses
Harman, Dynamite Column, KANSAS LIBERAL, June 8, 1883. Two weeks later, Har-
man added the qualification that dynamite should only be used "as a last resort."
Moses Harman, Dynamite Column, KANSAS LIBERAL, June 22, 1883.
8. Harman, supra note 6 (discussing Harman's relationship with socialists).
9. Moses Harman, EC Walker, KANSAS LIBERAL, Dec. 1, 1882.
10. Edwin Walker wrote a short biography in a letter to Joseph Labadie. See Letter from
Edwin Walker to Joseph Labadie (on file with the Special Collections Library, Uni-
versity of Michigan). I am following the rough lines of the letter here.
11. See, e.g., Edwin C. Walker, To-Day, LIBERTY, Jun. 9, 1883.
12. Benjamin Tucker "was the first American thinker to call himself an anarchist with
pride." PETER MARSHALL, DEMANDING THE IMPOSSIBLE: A HISTORY OF ANARCHY
389 (2010). Tucker was a strong-and strongly logical-opponent of state coercive
authority in both the economic and the personal spheres, believing that voluntary as-
sociations should largely take the place of government. Id. at 389-91.
13. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 44 (1997).
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Missouri to Colorado." He was thereby able to secure large numbers of
subscribers and bring added notice to Lucifer."
Indeed, by the middle of 1886, Moses and Edwin had achieved a
good deal of prominence. Charles Robinson, the Civil War Governor of
Kansas," had become an atheist and he favored the brashness and the
comprehensive revolutionary character of Lucifer's agenda. 7 He donated
money to Moses' endeavor" and could even be found from time to time
attending his political rallies." Moses had also secured the services of a
New York literary agent.20 His works had become known internationally.
Moses received correspondence from French and Russian radicals,2' pub-
lished the work of the Australian anarchist Joseph Symes,22 and even
came to the attention of the Madras Secular Society in India.23
Had Moses and Edwin merely stuck to their editing and their ad-
vocacy, they might have enjoyed comfortable lives. But Edwin and
14. For a couple of his travel accounts, see Edwin Walker, Editorial Wanderings, KANSAS
LIBERAL, Feb. 9, 1883; Edwin Walker, Editorial Wanderings, Chapter VI, KANSAS
LIBERAL, May 25, 1883.
15. See, e.g., List ofNew Subscribers, KANSAS LIBERAL, Mar. 2, 1883; List ofNew Subscrib-
ers, KANSAS LIBERAL, Mar. 30, 1883. Most issues of both the Kansas Liberal and its
later incarnation, Lucifer the Light-Bearer, contain lists of new subscribers.
16. Robinson has been the subject of two full-length biographies. See FRANK W.
BLACKMAR, THE LIFE OF CHARLES ROBINSON, THE FIRST STATE GOVERNOR OF KAN-
SAS (1902); DON W. WILsoN, GOVERNOR CHARLES ROBINSON OF KANSAS (1975).
17. Charles Robinson, Letters of Encouragement, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 2,
1883.
18. When Moses changed the name of his newspaper from the Kansas Liberal to Lucifer
the Light-Bearer, Governor Robinson made a substantial donation in anticipation that
Moses might lose subscriptions because of the controversial change of names. See id.
19. Moses Harman, Report of the Camp Meeting, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Sept. 14,
1883.
20. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Jul. 10, 1885 (announcing that George Rowell had
been retained to represent Lucifer in New York). Rowell was probably the leading
agent of his day. A contemporary wrote of him: "It is probably true that during the
past twenty-five years no name has been more familiar to the general reader or busi-
ness man than that of Mr. George P. Rowell." CHARLES MORRIS, MEN OF THE
CENTURY: AN HISTORICAL WORIC 67 (1896).
21. For examples of Moses' publishing excerpts from French authors, see LUCIFER THE
LIGHT-BEARER, Mar. 13, 1885 (publishing excerpts from Revue Anarchiste); LUCIFER
THE LIGHT-BEARER, Feb. 13, 1885 (Terre et liberte); LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER,
Jan. 16, 1885 (Le Rdvoltd). He received a letter from the famous French geographer
and anarchist Elisde Reclus which he published as A Letter From Elisle Reclus, LucI-
FER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 20, 1885. He also published Sergei Stepniak's essay
The Terrorist, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 28, 1883.
22. Joseph Symes, Marriage, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Apr. 9, 1886 (Supp.). This
essay was originally published in The Liberator of Melbourne, Australia (no date giv-
en).
23. See Free-Thought in India, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 13, 1885.
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Moses' daughter, Lillian had fallen in love. True to their principles, the
two lovers rejected conventional marriage. They proclaimed themselves
"autonomists" and "secularists." 24 Marriage, at least the form codified in
statutes and enforced by the courts, was incompatible with a worldview
that proclaimed that the marital union was a purely private matter not
requiring the authorization of church or state for its validity. And so, on
that fateful Sunday in September, in a small house in Valley Falls, there
assembled an intimate group of friends and relations to celebrate an "au-
tonomistic" or free-love marriage.
The wedding vows were specially drafted for the occasion and made
clear Edwin and Lillian's rejection of all extraneous legal power over mar-
riage. Moses Harman opened the proceeding by reading from a statement
of principles that he summarized as: "Marriage, being a strictly personal
matter, we deny the right of society ... to regulate it, or interfere with the
individual man or woman in this relation."25
The bride and groom followed Moses to the front of the room. Ed-
win Walker announced that in marrying Lillian he intended to "abdicate
in advance all the so-called marital rights" that traditionally accompanied
marriage.26 Speaking for both himself and Lillian he added: "We severally
and together repudiate all powers legally conferred upon husbands and'
wives." 27 The state, he insisted, must be affirmatively excluded from hav-
ing any role in the marriage, either in its formation or its termination.
Nor did it have any place in property division or determination of child
custody upon divorce. All of these matters were private, and only the in-
dividuals involved were competent to resolve them.28
Lillian then spoke briefly: "I agree with the views of my father and of
Mr. Walker just expressed. I make no promises that it may become impos-
sible or immoral for me to fulfill, but retain the right to act always as my
conscience and best judgment shall dictate." 29 While the wording of this
assertion was somewhat obscure, Lillian's intent was clear: traditional mar-
riage required permanence, and Lillian had just publicly declared that she
could not agree to this as a condition of married life. The promise to re-
main together forever might become "impossible of fulfillment."'o The
24. State v. Walker, 13 P. 279, 280 (Kan. 1887).
25. Walker, 13 P. at 281.
26. Walker, 13 P. at 281.
27. Walker, 13 P. at 281-82.
28. Walker, 13 P. at 282.
29. Walker, 13 P. at 282.
30. Moses Harman, Statement of Principles in Regard to Marriage, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-
BEARER, Sept. 17, 1886.
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newlyweds then spent the night together." The next day, William Hiser,
Lillian's stepbrother and Moses's stepson, frightened by what he had
witnessed the day before and fearful of mob vengeance, 32 swore out an
arrest warrant with the local constable.33 The police then "invaded" the
Harman home, arresting Edwin and Lillian." The charge was serious:
Edwin and Lillian were alleged to have "unlawfully, feloniously, live[d]
together as man and wife without being or having been married; contra-
ry to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Kansas.""
Thus began State v. Walker, one of the most improbable cases in the
history of American family law jurisprudence. It is likely that no case
ever presented more clearly or emphatically a radically new vision for the
marital relationship. Legal marriage, Moses insisted, is "legalized prostitu-
tion."" It required men and women who no longer loved each other,
indeed, who could no longer tolerate one another's presence, to remain
together simply because the state insisted upon it." Moses' insistent
message was there is "no love but free love."
Walker subscribed to the same views. Indeed, he argued that free
love was the best means of ensuring equality between the sexes." The
great problem in marriage, according to Walker, was male dominance.
Men, left unchecked, were likely to become abusive.40 Free love gave the
woman a means of escape. If the man did become abusive, if he grew
overbearing and tyrannical, then the woman was free to depart. And this
31. E.C. Walker & Lillian Harman, Friends of Liberty, Attention!, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-
BEARER, Sept. 17, 1886 (reprinting the arrest warrant).
32. Moses Harman portrays Hiser as a "pliant tool" who succumbed to pressures brought
to bear by the Christians of Valley Falls and who sought to have Edwin and Lillian
arrested because otherwise he feared that they might have been "lynch[ed]" by angry
townsfolk. Moses Harman, Who Are the Criminals?, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER,
Dec. 17, 1886; see Walker & Harman, supra note 31 (identifying Hiser as Lillian's
stepbrother).
33. Walker & Harman, supra note 31.
34. Arrested', supra note 1.
35. Walker & Harman, supra note 31.
36. Moses Harman, Free Love, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 3, 1884.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Edwin C. Walker, "Off the Track" Again, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Aug. 28,
1884. "Free Love demands that the woman shall have control of her own person, that
the right of choice shall not be denied and the opportunity to rectify mistakes shall
not be taken away." Id.
40. Id.
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freedom, Walker concluded, would exert a kind of market discipline
over men, making sure that they remained on their best behavior.'
The true radicalism of this stance becomes apparent when one con-
trasts it to two other types of cases: the same-sex marriage cases of the
last twenty years and the Mormon polygamy cases of the 1870s and
1880s. If we assume that the essential legal attributes of marriage in-
clude its public nature, its permanence, and its exclusivity, then Moses
Harman's challenge raised much more fundamental questions about the
nature of the marital relationship than either of these classes of cases.
After all, the exponents of same-sex marriage have not wished to alter
these basic elements of marriage. Rather, they seek to expand the catego-
ry of those eligible to share in marriage's legal benefits and expectations.
Marriage, they maintain, especially if conceived principally in emotional
terms, should be open to same-sex couples who wish to commit them-
selves as permanently and exclusively to one another as heterosexual
couples are already allowed to do.42
The Mormon polygamy cases also fit within this paradigm. They
did not aim to make marriage a private matter, nor did they seek to de-
stroy its permanence and exclusivity. The Mormon men who litigated
these cases certainly sought to expand the range of "exclusivity" from
sexual relations with one spouse to several. But these were not transient
relationships, lightly undertaken and easily discarded. Rather, they were
made with the greatest seriousness and solemnity. They were nothing
less than celestial marriages, valid not only here on earth but for all eter-
.43ruty.
The case that the two Harmans and Walker wished to present,
however, aimed to transform marriage from a public to a private rela-
tionship and from a permanent and exclusive one to a temporary one
41. Id. ("Liberty to change [sexual partners] insures the greatest degree of permanence
possible in the relations of any man and woman. Fear ofloss puts each upon his or her
good behavior and thus prevents very much of the neglect, coldness, taunting, and
mutual recrimination which produce a large share of the misery of married life.").
42. This point is made especially clearly in the California case, In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 422-24 (Cal. 2008). "'Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctly personal aspects of one's life.'" Id. at 423 (quoting Warfield v. Peninsula
Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 795 (Cal. 1995)).
43. Thus Parley P. Pratt, a nineteenth-century Mormon elder, defended plural marriage
by reference to its eternal permanence: "0 candidates for celestial glory! Would your
joys be full in the countless years of eternity without forming the connexions, the re-
lationships, the kindred ties which concentrate in the domestic circle, and branch
forth, and bud and blossom, and bear the fruits of eternal increase?" PARLEY P.
PRATT, KEY TO THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY 161 (1855).
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that permitted potentially many partners. State v. Walker and its parties
have received some scholarly notice, but the truly radical quality of the
arguments Moses, Edwin, and Lillian presented has yet to be fully ap-
preciated."
This Article's principal purpose is to present and analyze these ar-
guments and the judicial response to them, thereby shedding light on
contemporary debates over whether the state should withdraw from the
marriage arena. Scholars from various perspectives have come to main-
tain that the state's leading role in defining marriage should yield to
private contractual ordering." In a pluralistic era where groups within
society disagree fundamentally over the essential attributes of marriage,
it is argued that the time has come to abandon narrow, one-size-fits-all
public definitions of marriage in favor of a rich tapestry of differing per-
sonal perspectives and points of view. 6
The article, however, has at least two subsidiary purposes. Moses,
Lillian, Edwin, and their supporters made use of a vocabulary that
would come to influence our own word choices when speaking of the
right to sexual privacy. They spoke of a woman's right to her body, the
right of the woman to control the reproductive processes, and the mo-
rality and necessity of excluding the state from regulating these aspects
of intimate life. This Article intends to recover and evaluate this lan-
44. Hal Sears devotes parts of two chapters to State v. Walker, but he generally avoids
discussion of the legal issues. See HAL D. SEARS, THE SEx RADICALS: FREE LOVE IN
HIGH VIcToIAN AMERICA 81-106 (1977). In his brilliant book on the subject, Dan
Rabban recognizes the importance of Moses Harman and Lucifer the Light-Bearer to
the development of the right of free speech in America. See RABBAN, supra note 13, at
40-46. Because his concern is free expression and efforts of the federal government in
the nineteenth century to suppress it, Rabban principally addresses the prosecution of
Moses Harman under federal law. Id. Our concern, on the other hand, is with the
Kansas case of State v. Walker and what it says about efforts to deregulate marriage
and the right of privacy.
45. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE
FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010); cf Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian"Argument for Pri-
vatizing Marriage, 27 CARwozo L. REV. 1221 (2006) (making a theologically-grounded
argument in favor of severing marriage and state); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating
Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOzo L. REV.
1161 (2006) (arguing on law-and-economics grounds that marriage and the state can
be successfully separated).
46. An important early article making some of these arguments is Eric Rasmussen &
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract,
73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998). Cf Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, De-
fault Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (2010) (outlining
ground rules that might be used in regulating polygamy in situations where plural
marriages come to be recognized by law).
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guage. Theirs is not our right to privacy, but it is an interesting and im-
portant precursor.
Finally, taken as a whole, this Article can be seen as an anatomy of
an early civil liberties test case. In the twentieth century, test cases be-
came a crucial means of advancing rights-whether we speak of
African-American civil rights, war-time conscientious objector cases,
the right to marital and sexual privacy, or more recent claims concern-
ing same-sex marriage. In reconstructing State v. Walker we are
necessarily engaged in considering how one of the earliest civil liberties
test cases was framed, litigated, publicized, and used.
The Harmans and Walker embarked on this case a century and a
quarter before our own time. What prompted them to do what they
did? How did they present their case and argue it? Why did they lose?
And might they be understood to have succeeded when the long run of
history is considered? The answers to these questions will provide im-
portant lessons to those engaged in the contemporary debate.
II. RECONSTRUCTING STATE V. WALKER
A. Legal Analysis of the Promises
1. Free Love
When Edwin and Lillian exchanged promises before the group as-
sembled in the home of Lillian's father, they intended to bring into
being a free-love union. State v. Walker was fundamentally about free
love. All of the legal claims and principles that the defendants would
subsequently make in their briefs and oral arguments, all of their uses of
sophisticated casuistry, can really be reduced to a single basic proposi-
tion: men and women should be free to move from one relationship to
another when love dies, or commitment fades, without the permission
of or interference from the state.
The expression "free love" is commonly associated with the 1960s.
While free love certainly enjoyed its moment in the sun during that ex-
uberant, fun-filled decade, the term actually originated at a significantly
earlier point in American history. Indeed, the expression can first be
found in the writings and recommendations of some religious commu-
nities of the 1830s and 1840s.
The oldest of these movements is associated with John Humphrey
Noyes (1811-1886). Noyes was a native of Vermont who in his youth
attended all the finest theological schools-Andover Newton Seminary,
2012] 79
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Yale Divinity School, and Dartmouth College. It was at Yale that
Noyes developed his doctrine of "perfectability," which taught that those
who gave themselves totally to God were thereby exempted from the
dreary constraints of mere terrestrial law."
As so often happens with religious communities that declare their
independence from all civil and secular authority, Noyes and his follow-
ers soon found themselves doing things that attracted the unwelcome
attention of law enforcement. In Noyes' case, this was the practice of
free love. In the Kingdom of Heaven, as Noyes interpreted the Gospel of
Matthew, they neither marry nor are given in marriage." And so it
should be among his followers: they had attained the glorious celestial
Kingdom here on earth and so were henceforward empowered to enter
into liaisons known as "complex marriage" which might involve one or
multiple partners. These unions might demand procreative or non-
procreative intercourse, mere foreplay or actual penetration, all depending
on the state of one's spiritual health.o
Faced with the hostility and suspicions of their more conventional
neighbors, they abandoned their headquarters in Putney, Vermont after
Noyes and some followers were charged with adultery." Fleeing the ju-
risdiction rather than electing to stand trial, they relocated to Oneida,
New York, where they managed to live in relative harmony with the out-
side world.52 While their experiment in group living had already ceased
by the time of Noyes' death in 1886, the business enterprise they found-
ed to support their intricate lifestyle-Oneida Cutlery-lives on as a
fine manufacturer of flatware today.
The Oneida Community, however, was hardly alone among free-
love experiments, both religious and secular, during the middle decades
47. ROBERT ALLERTON PARKER, A YANKEE SAINT: JOHN HUMPHREY NOYES, AND THE
ONEIDA COMMUNITY 21-30 (photo. reprint 1973) (1935).
48. SPENCER KIAw, WITHOUT SIN: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY
23-29 (1993).
49. JOHN HUMPHREY NOYES, BIBLE COMMUNISM (photo. reprint 1972) (1853); cf Mat-
thew 22:30 ("For when the dead arise, they will neither marry nor be given in
marriage. . .").
50. MARK HOLLOWAY, UTOPIAN COMMUNITIES IN AMERICA, 1680-1880, at 179-97
(1966); RICHARD T. SCHAEFER & WILLIAM W. ZELLNER, EXTRAORDINARY GROUPS:
AN EXAMINATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL LIFESTYLES 68-78 (8th ed. 2008).
51. ROBERT S. FOGARTY, SPECIAL LOVE, SPECIAL SEx: AN ONEIDA COMMUNITY DIARY 11
(1994).
52. STEPHEN J. STEIN, COMMUNITIES OF DISSENT: A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE RELI-
GIONS IN AMERICA 63 (2003).
53. DONALD F. BUSKY, COMMUNISM IN HISTORY AND THEORY: FROM UTOPIAN SocIAL-
ISM TO THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION 94 (2002); MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN,
ONEIDA: UTOPIAN COMMUNITY TO MODERN CORPORATION 113-98 (1969).
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of the nineteenth century. Spiritualism was another source of free love
ideas and practice. In 1848, the same year Noyes founded the Oneida
Community, just a little more than 110 miles to the West, in Hydesville,
near Rochester, New York, spiritualism was born. It was there that two
young girls, aged fourteen and eleven, demonstrated their other-worldly
capacity to communicate with an unlucky peddler who had been mur-
dered in their home some years before and now lay buried in the cellar."
It is easy to dismiss spiritualism today as the playground of a few
errant cranks and mediums. But in the middle and late nineteenth cen-
tury it was held in high esteem by large numbers of Americans (and
foreigners too, particularly English ones). Spiritualism was endorsed and
supported by quite reputable figures. Alfred Russel Wallace," a co-
discoverer of the theory of evolution with Charles Darwin, became in
later life a committed spiritualist believing that human life was steadily
progressing towards the higher plane already occupied by the spiritual
56realm.
But many spiritualists were little better than charlatans and fakes
who were simultaneously eager to exploit their privileged connections
with the spiritual world and to promote and practice free love for the
sake of their sexual desires. One of the biggest of these was Andrew Jack-
son Davis, who firmly believed that for every man there must be one
woman fated and destined to be a perfect fit." In this earthly life, he
maintained, we must search relentlessly for this soulmate" because only
if we find her can we spend all of eternity in happiness and joy." We
54. MARY E. CADWALLADER, HYDESVILLE IN HISTORY 11-12 (1917).
55. For a standard biography of Wallace, see PETER RABY, ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE: A
LIFE (2001).
56. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, THE WORLD OF LIFE: A MANIFESTATION OF CREATIVE
POWER, DIRECTIVE MIND AND ULTIMATE PURPOSE 421 (1911).
57. An earthly marriage to one not destined as one's eternal soulmate, in Davis' estima-
tion, amounted to nothing less than "a mere legal mockery of the genuine-for
sensual gratification and temporary purposes." ANDREW JACKSON DAVIS, THE HA-R-
BINGER OF HEALTH 194 (1862).
58. SUZANNE R. THURMAN, "0 SISTERS, AIN'T You HAPPY?": GENDER, FAMILY, AND
COMMUNITY AMONG THE HARVARD AND SHIRLEY SHAKERS, 1781-1918, at 150
(2002).
59. "It is now plain to me, as is the noon-tide sunshine, that although it is true that an
eternal marriage of the spirits (or, which is the same thing, the perfect conjugal union
of one man with one woman) is impossible where the central temperaments do not
harmonize; yet it does not necessarily and unchangeably follow that, because these piv-
otal temperaments harmonize, the marriage is inevitably eternal. The immoveable basis
of the true harmonial nuptial relation is the conjugal love of the eternal spirit for ITS
OWN heaven-designed and God-ordained COUNTERPART." ANDREW JACKSON
DAVIS, BEYOND THE VALLEY: A SEQUEL TO "THE MAGIC STAFF": AN AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF ANDREW JACKSON DAVIS 103 (1885).
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should experiment, pass through "minor marriages," have our brief
flings and affairs, all for the happiness of our immortal soul.o It is no
surprise that Davis passed through more than a few such relationships in
61
his own tireless quest for the ideal partner.
Moses Harman was not a religious believer, nor a spiritualist or
charlatan. His commitment to free love was a matter of philosophical
principle. He had married twice. His first wife died in childbirth in
1877.62 He married again in 1880 and also outlived his second wife,
who died in 1895.6' He was entirely devoted to both women.,
He believed, however, that the law of marriage was the greatest im-
pediment to successful marriage. He was fortunate in his marriages but
many people, especially women, were trapped in loveless marriages or in
abusive marriages where their husbands routinely raped them. They
needed to be able to move freely to new relationships. Moses, indeed,
was among the first, if not the very first, to speak of marital rape as a
reality.65 He believed the cure for this personal and social disorder was
freedom. At a time before no-fault divorce, such mobility was not fa-
vored by the law, and so Moses made the claim for freedom as forcefully
as he could. In advocating for free love of this sort, Moses was in good
company. Elizabeth Cady Stanton was making precisely these arguments
in old Puritan New England.
60. See JOHN C. SPURLOCK, FREE LovE: MARRIAGE AND MIDDLE-CLASS RADICALISM IN
AMERICA, 1825-1860, at 92 (1988).
61. Catherine L. Albanese, On the Matter of the Spirit: Andrew Jackson Davis and the
Marriage of God and Nature, 60 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 1, 10 (1992).
62. See Reid, supra note 3.
63. See Obituary, Isabella Hiser Harman, VALLEY FALLS FARMERS' VINDICATOR, Jul. 26,
1895.
64. Moses' devotion to his first wife is explored in my manuscript, Lucifer's Children,
supra note 3. For Moses' devotion to his second wife, see Letter from Moses Harman
to Mrs. William Denton (Apr. 30, 1889) (on file with the Special Collections Li-
brary, University of Michigan) (discussing in detail his wife's physical illnesses,
including early blindness, and his concern for her health).
65. In Social Evolution, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 23, 1885, Moses calls for a
reform of the marriage law to take account of the reality that many husbands freely
rape their wives within marriage. Cf Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History ofMarital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1373, 1446-47 nn.244-45 (2000) (discuss-
ing Moses Harman).
66. "Freedom and on this subject! Why that is nothing short of unlimited freedom of
divorce, freedom to institute at the option of the parties new amatory relationships,
love put above marriage and in a word the obnoxious doctrine of Free Love. Well yes
that is what I mean. We are one and all free lovers at heart although we may not have
thought so." Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Speech on Free Love, in 2 THE SELECTED PA-
PERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY: AGAINST AN
ARISTOCRACY OF SEX, 1866-1877, at 394 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997).
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This, then, must be the interpretive key through which State v.
Walker should be understood: Moses sought freedom not in order to
maximize pleasure-seeking, promote male promiscuity, or satisfy his own
boundless urges, but to make women less vulnerable by allowing them
greater opportunity to escape troubled unions freely.
2. The Public Interest in Marriage
Moses' position was in direct contradiction with the prevailing
American law of marriage. Nineteenth-century legal commentators and
judicial decisions constantly reiterated the centrality of marriage to pub-
lic order. Writing in the 184 0s, Chancellor James Kent of New York
declared that marriage "is one of the chief foundations of social order.""
The great treatise-writer Joel Prentiss Bishop, relying upon the Scottish
ecclesiastical judge William Lord Robertson (1753-1835), wrote that
marriage "'is the most important of all human transactions. It is the very
basis of the whole fabric of civilized society.' "" Frank Keezer, writing
twenty years after State v. Walker, held the same position: "[Marriage is]
the most important of domestic relations. It is the source of the family,
the safeguard of public and private morals, [and] the strength of the
nation."" Common to all of these definitions is the public nature of mar-
riage. Marriage may have served the private interests of its parties, but it
had a public importance that transcended the subjective whims and fan-
cies of isolated individuals. Such a public purpose needed the protection
of the law.
Case law insisted that it was because of its great public significance
that all marriages, even common-law marriages which occurred without
benefit of state authority, had to be publicly known and acknowledged. 7
67. 2 CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 74 (1840).
68. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
6 (1881) (quoting Lord Robertson's opinion in Duntze v. Levert, 3 Eng. Eccl. Rep.
360).
69. FRANK KEEZER, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 5 (1906).
70. Common-law marriage is misnamed. It has its origin, rather, in the practice of medi-
eval canon law. The canonist Gratian taught that consent in the present tense,
standing alone, made a marriage. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Power to Choose, 4 VIATOR
419, 419-34; RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 238-
40 (1996). Although church authority sought in many ways to punish those who
married by consent alone, without availing themselves of witnesses or documentation,
such marriages remained valid in the eyes of the Church. See CHARLES J. REID, JR.,
POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY: RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAw 50-55 (2004). These canon-law forms were then
passed through the medium of the English ecclesiastical law to the early American
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In 1884, two years before the Harmans and Edwin Walker celebrated
their autonomistic marriage, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered a case of common-law marriage which the parties sought to keep
secret out of a fear of offending family members." Justice Stephen Field,
writing for the Court, explained that marriage depended for its very ex-
istence upon public acknowledgement since it protected and promoted
transcendent social goods:
[S]ome public recognition of [a marriage] is necessary as evi-
dence of its existence. The protection of the parties and their
children and considerations of public policy require this public
recognition; and it may be made in any way which can be seen
and known by men, such as living together as man and wife,
treating each other and speaking of each other in the presence
of third parties as being in that relation, and declaring the rela-
tion in documents executed by them whilst living together,
such as deeds, wills, and other formal instruments.7 2
Certainly, Edwin and Lillian's public ceremony was designed and
intended to receive publicity, whatever the disclaimers of the parties.
However, mere public notoriety was not enough to make a marriage, let
alone satisfy the standards of the Supreme Court. The union could not
be a "meretricious" one.7 ' The parties had to conform their ceremonies
and their lives to the public expectation of what constituted marriage.
They had to be seen and understood by friends, extended family, busi-
ness associates, and interested third parties, as living together not in
order to satisfy transient sexual urges but because they had chosen to
form an exclusive and permanent intimate relationship with one anoth-
er.74 That was the meaning of Justice Field's opinion and it was a point
that countless courts concurred on,75 even if Harman and his circle dis-
sented.
But if marriage was a public occasion, if it was designed to satisfy
public needs, what counted as its public purposes? The answer. to this
states, where they were transformed into the misnomered "common-law marriage."
See GoRAN LIND, COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHAITA-
TION 131-71 (2008).
71. Maryland ex rel. Markley v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 494 (1884).
72. Baldwin, 112 U.S. at 495.
73. Cartwright v. McGown, 12 N.E. 737, 741 (Ill. 1887).
74. Banks v. Galbraith, 51 S.W. 105, 106 (Mo. 1899).
75. See, e.g., Robinson v. Taylor, 42 F. 803, 807 (N.D. Miss. 1890); Taylor v. Taylor, 50
P. 1049, 1050 (Colo. App. 1897); McKenna v. McKenna, 54 N.E. 641, 646 (Ill.
1899).
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question varied from court to court. This was a chance for judges to
philosophize, and they more than rose to the occasion. Marriage might
be about the procreation of children," their education, and their prep-
aration to assume the obligations of the next generation. 7 It might
78promote and secure the happiness of the parties themselves. It might
serve as the incubator of civilization7 ' and be a shield for the freedoms
we enjoy as members of a free nation.o Marriage acted as the stitching
holding together the "social fabric.""' It might be a sacred duty, 2 a
commandment from God, an expression and a bulwark of the divine
and natural law."
It would be a mistake to treat these invocations as mere boiler-
plate, or as the court clearing its throat before rendering its judgment
in a particular case. To be sure, these were rhetorical flourishes, meant
to impress readers with the seriousness of the marital obligation. But
the rhetoric was chosen because courts truly believed in these purposes
and principles.
Tampering with these public purposes was quite likely to land the
culprits in a great deal of difficulty. Moses, Edwin, and Lillian were
treading far into the danger zone with their manifestos and free-love
ceremonies. Moses Harman's denunciation of state regulation of mar-
riage as reducing people to the status of "minor wards of the state,"
76. Sissung v. Sissung, 31 N.W. 770, 772 (Mich. 1887); Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332,
337 (1847).
77. Foster v. Alston, 7 Miss. 406, 429 (1842).
78. Barnes v. Barnes, 30 P. 298 (Cal. 1892).
79. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
80. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
81. Fisk v. Fisk, 34 N.Y.S. 33, 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895).
82. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1890); Smith v. Smith, 4 Greene 266,
271 (Iowa 1854); Farnum v. Bartlett, 52 Me. 570 (1864).
83. See Hinkle v. Hinkle, 11 S.E. 993, 995 (W. Va. 1892) (referring to the relationship
between marriage statutes and the "natural and Christian relations of the sexes").
84. See Succession of Caballero, 24 La. Ann. 573, 575-76 (1872).
85. Lawyers in the latter half of the nineteenth century took marriage with the utmost
seriousness. Indeed, it can be said that many social commentators and lawyers felt
that traditional marriage was faced with deep threats-from Mormon polygamy on
the one hand, and from free-love movements of various sorts on the other. Mormon
polygamy has been subjected to truly vast scholarship. For a good recent book to con-
sult on this topic, see SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2002) (providing a helpful history of the campaign for and against Mormon polyg-
amy from the Republican platform of 1856 to final conflicts of 1890). Free love, on
the other hand, has not been much explored from the vantage point of legal histori-
ans. Still, the campaign against it was intense. For one example of the extremes this
polemic could reach, see JOHN B. ELLIS, FREE LOVE AND ITS VOTARIES (1870) (de-
scribing and denouncing various free love communities across the United States).
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Edwin Walker's description of his union with Lillian as "this private
compact," his further statement that neither society nor the state had
"any right to inquire into or determine" the nature of the parties' rela-
tions, and Lillian Harman's defense of these views, represented a radical
challenge to the premises upon which the law of matrimonial relations
depended."
3. Permanence, Exclusivity, and Children
Edwin Walker used his marriage vows as a way of stating a series of
transcendent principles. He announced as part of his promises that he
and Lillian remained free to do as they pleased in the sense that neither
could make any binding legal claim against the behavior of the other
party. This is the clearest and most unambiguous interpretation that can
be placed on his assertion that they remained "sovereign" over their own
affairs." Lillian concurred with this statement." They both acknowl-
edged the possibility that some "unfortunate fate" could intrude to
"dissolve this union," at which point they were free to move to new rela-
tionships without state interference.
The nineteenth-century legal mind, as much as that of the twenty-
first century, would understand these declarations as repudiating the
essential matrimonial elements of permanence and exclusivity. As the
1875 Supreme Court case Randall v. Kreiger made clear, "[m]arriage is an
institution founded upon mutual consent."' 0 This did not mean, however,
that parties might freely alter the terms of the deal. The Randall Court
continued: "That consent is a contract, but it is one sui generis. Its
peculiarities are very marked. . . . It can neither be cancelled nor altered at
the will of the parties upon any new consideration. The public will and
policy controls [the parties'] will."" The public will favored marital
permanence, exclusivity, and the procreation and education of children.9
Why, then, were these two marital elements exalted into the "public
will and policy?" Fundamentally, legal commentators explained, this was
simply the way it had to be-marriage had to be permanent, parties to it
had to submit to the will of the state, and children had to be welcomed.
86. State v. Walker, 13 P. 279, 281-82 (Kan. 1887).
87. Walker, 13 P. at 281.
88. Walker, 13 P. at 281.
89. Walker, 13 P. at 281.
90. Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137, 147 (1874).
91. Randall, 90 U.S. at 147.
92. See, e.g., Jordan v. Westerman, 28 N.W. 826, 830 (Mich. 1886); Reynolds v. State,
78 N.W. 483, 484 (Neb. 1899); Cook v. Cook, 14 N.W. 33, 35-36 (Wis. 1882).
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Marriage possessed indissoluble qualities that outweighed the private
whims and fancies of the individuals involved, and it was best not to
question that proposition too deeply.13
When pressed harder to provide better explanations, judges some-
times merely repeated with greater force and embellishment the "public
interest" language reviewed above. The Iowa Supreme Court wrote:
"The public has an interest in these cases, and the parties cannot be
their own judges."" In explaining why it would dismiss a petition for
divorce where it was apparent the parties had colluded in their efforts to
ensure a favorable outcome, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote, "It is up-
on the principle that the parties do not have the only interest, but the
public also has an interest in the marriage relation."95
Such reasoning, of course, has flaws. It could be described as circu-
lar or question-begging. You can pick your logical quarrel with this type
of judicial reasoning and whatever your choice happens to be, it will
land you pretty close to the truth. Nineteenth-century courts and com-
mentators must have shared this uneasiness since many of them
ventured beyond this simple repetitiveness to offer more intellectually
satisfying defenses of permanence and exclusivity."
One of the most important justifications was the protection of
children. By defending marriage in this way, courts believed that they
were conferring benefits not only on the children of particular relation-
ships, but upon spouses generally as well as the public at large since
everybody benefited from well-raised children. "The end of marriage,"
an 1872 edition of John Bouvier's Institutes ofAmerican Law declared,
"is the procreation of children and the propagation of the species."9 7 If
the court declined to grant a divorce petition, the Iowa Supreme Court
helpfully informed litigants, it was "for the good of their common off-
spring, the conservation of social order, and the maintenance of general
93. W.C. RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 98 (1899).
94. Lyster v. Lyster (Inskeep v. Inskeep), 1 Iowa 130, 133 (1855).
95. Danforth v. Danforth, 105 Ill. 603, 607 (1883); cf Jay v. East Livermore, 56 Me.
107, 118 (1868) (noting that "the public have an interest in [cases of divorce]" and
that "[m]orality[,] domestic relations, [] public policy[,] and the peace of society" all
support strict judicial scrutiny of divorce petitions).
96. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals wrote: "[Marriage] should be indissolu-
ble, except for the gravest causes." Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516, 522 (1873). The
Michigan Supreme Court added: "All our legislation has been framed in the belief
that the marriage tie should be indissoluble, except upon cause shown." People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 255 (1872). Finally, an Illinois appellate court wrote: "If the
marriage is valid it is indissoluble by the parties to it. They are by such marriage in-
separable-man and wife." Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Ill. App. 165, 171 (1887).
97. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAw 59 (Daniel A. Gleason ed., 1872).
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morality."08 As the Iowa court intimated, the protection of children was
frequently connected to the preservation of morality: "The well being of
society, the interest of the children of the marriage, good morals and the
precepts of religion," wrote the Illinois Supreme Court, "all forbid that
the marriage contract should be dissolved unless the objects of the rela-
tion have been defeated."99
But courts sometimes offered other justifications as well. The par-
ties, they said, were made into better people by the necessity of
remaining together. Permanence helped develop the virtues. Parties who
know they can never leave a marriage would be made more tolerant,
more forbearant of one another's foibles. A pre-Civil-War decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals quoted an English ecclesiastical decision by
William Scott, the first Lord Stowell (1745-1836) to this effect:
[I]t must be carefully remembered that the general happiness
of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When peo-
ple understand that they must live together, except for a very
few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften, by mutual
accommodation, that yoke which they know they cannot
shake off; they become good husbands and wives from the ne-
cessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a
powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes.'00
The presence or absence of children in any particular union was ir-
relevant to this type of analysis. Marital permanence aimed to improve
the character of the individuals involved. By extension, third parties also
benefited because the promotion of virtuous individuals would lead
eventually to the uplifting of public morality.
Exclusivity was a value given equal strength and prominence with
permanence and procreation. David Stewart, in his commentary on
marriage published the year before Edwin and Lillian so loosely tied the
knot, spoke of the "unity" of husband and wife as an essential analytical
98. Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa 451, 456 (1871).
99. De La Hay v. De La Hay, 21 111. 252, 255 (1859). The Court spelled out what was
meant by the defeat of the objects of marriage: "[where] the cohabitation of the par-
ties has become productive of wrong, or the safety of one of the parties is
endangered." Id.
100. Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294, 314 (1858) (quoting Evans v. Evans, (1790) 161
Eng. Rep. 466, 467). Lord Stowell was sympathetic to the petition but insisted: "Eve-
ry body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other,
who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any de-
gree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings ... "
Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. at 466. American cases that looked to Evans generally omitted
Lord Stowell's qualifications, reiterating merely the severe part of his rule.
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category of marriage law.'o' Stewart was only echoing a long line of cas-
es. Following the Bible, courts had long held that husband and wife
constituted "one flesh,"10 2 and that the closeness of this connection abso-
lutely precluded the possibility of sexual partners other than one's
spouse.103 Indeed, depending on the facts of the case, the person who
strayed from his or her marriage vows was guilty of either adultery'o' or
bigamy, both of which were understood as crimes against marriage it-
self.'
This intense judicial commitment to marital permanence and ex-
clusivity was founded on the Christian patrimony that American courts
inherited from England. Lacking a well-developed marriage jurispru-
dence of their own, early American courts turned to English
ecclesiastical antecedents for support. This reliance, in turn, conferred
on early American domestic-relations law a distinctly religious appear-
ance. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century judicial opinions imparted to
marriage law (quite unconsciously) special solicitude for the perma-
nence, exclusivity, and procreation that St. Augustine first ascribed to
matrimony at the end of the fourth century.'0o
No wonder that dedicated secularists and atheists like the Harmans
and Walker rebelled so strenuously against this legal order, with its rigid
formality, its one-size-fits-all contractual terms, and its willingness to
make all married partners, whatever their personal predispositions, con-
form to a unitary public policy.
101. DAVID STEWART, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE: As ESTABLISHED IN ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1885).
102. See, e.g., Jonas v. Hirshberg, 48 N.E. 656, 663 (Ind. App. 1897); Long v. Long, 77
N.C. 304, 311 (1877) (Rodman, J., dissenting); cf Harris v. Webster, 58 N.H. 481,
481 (1878) (using the old Latin term "caro una" for "one flesh").
103. See, e.g., Lanier v. Lanier, 52 Tenn. 462, 471-72 (1871) (Turney, J., dissenting); see
also Stiles v. Stiles, 62 Ill. App. 408, 416 (1895) (expressing reluctance to believe
adultery had occurred).
104. On adultery as a crime against marriage, see ROBERT DESTY, A COMPENDIUM OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 223-24 (1882). Cf State v. Moore, 31 Tenn. 136, 137
(1851) (arguing adultery "is a direct attack upon the marriage institution"); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18, 20 (1885) (holding adultery is an offense "against sound
morals and good government").
105. See ELLIS LEWIS, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
114-18 (1847).
106. I explore this history in Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods ofMarriage: The
Disappearing Cornerstone ofAmerican Marriage Law, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 449 (2004).
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B. Assembling the Pieces
Court cases, especially those that generate a great deal of public in-
terest, are like wild carrousel rides. They are at the mercy of the quirks
and moods of actors outside the control of the parties themselves. There
is the interested public, a public whose views of the case are often
shaped and determined by the journalists who cover the case. There are
also the lawyers, who are zealous advocates, but may also bring to bear a
deep and abiding sense of what the law ought to say. Finally, there are
the judges, whose personalities are as variable as the human experience
itself, who interject their own viewpoints and prejudices into the way
they decide the case. State v. Walker had all of these elements, plus the
sensationalism of sex and free love.
1. The Atmosphere
Newspapers of the late nineteenth century were not like newspapers
today. Editors would not have understood the principle of objectivity.
Quite self-consciously, they saw themselves as exponents of political par-
ties or particular points of view. They were clearing houses of partisan
information and provided fora for public debate.107 When they got a
good story, they were all too eager to sensationalize it, both as a chance
to put a political spin on the events and also to drive up readership and
advertising rates.108
These newspapers depended on controversy for their lifeblood. Po-
lemic, dialectic, whatever it be called, the controversy over Edwin and
Lillian's marriage gave birth to a range of ideas and words that would
shape and color American law. Some writers began to speak of a right to
be left alone in the sexual relation and a liberty to control the reproduc-
tive processes-a "freedom," as Lillian Harman put it, "of Choice and
Contract."' 9o
It would be a mistake to expect that these word choices and linguis-
tic turns of phrase carried the same meaning in the 1880s as they do
today. It would be positively ahistorical to announce triumphally that
the right to privacy existed a century and a quarter ago in anything like
107. See RicHAR.D L. KAPLAN, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS: THE RISE OF OBJEC-
TITY, 1865-1920, at 22-23 (2002).
108. See Erika J. Pribanic-Smith, Sensationalism and Tabloidism, in AMERICAN JOURNAL-
IsM: HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES 267, 269-71 (W. David Sloan & Lisa
Mullikan Purcell eds., 2002).
109. Infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
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its modern form. It is significant, however, that these concepts were be-
ing thought about at all. In astronomical terms, this was something akin
to planetary formation. These linguistic choices put into place material
that would become, through the long work of gravitation, a large and
important member of the solar system of constitutional thought.
a. Attack and Destroy
The Republican newspaper in Valley Falls, the Valley Falls New Era,
had already gained notoriety for its consistently moralizing tone. It rou-
tinely published famous sermons and labeled itself the wholesome
defender of Christian piety."o In the summer of 1886, just prior to Ed-
win and Lillian's wedding, it was campaigning against the transcendent
evil of Sunday baseball."'
The Harman-Walker case was far too rich and inviting an oppor-
tunity to pass up. Within days of the ceremony, the New Era was on the
attack. The marriage was "so brazen, flagrant, and exasperating that
public indignation knew no bounds.""l2 Thank Heaven, Moses' stepson
had the good sense to swear out that arrest warrant." 3 This should final-
ly stop their "revolutionary and insurrectionary notions" and end their
vile and nauseating doctrines.
Papers all around Kansas joined the chorus. Some newspapers went
so far as to suggest that vigilante justice was in order. The Argus, pub-
lished about thirteen miles from Valley Falls in Winchester, Kansas,
asked whether there was something wrong with its neighboring munici-
pality that its citizens did not take the law into their own hands and
bodily expel the miscreants who dared such dirty deeds: "In any other
town almost, public sentiment would be so strong against the outfit, the
Lucifer would suddenly cease publication and the Walker-Harmon [sic]
crowd would evacuate the city."'
The Independent, published in Oskaloosa, about seventeen or
eighteen miles from Valley Falls, thought it was about time the law acted
against the Lucifer crowd. That foul paper advocated for "free thought,
110. Robert Laird Collier, The Great English Divine: Spurgeon as Preacher-Secret of His
Power-Simple Saxon Speech, VALLEY FALLS NEW ERA, Aug. 12, 1886 (summarizing
sermons by the English preacher C.H. Spurgeon).
111. Sunday Base Ball, VALLEY FALLS NEW ERA, June 10, 1886.
112. A Disgraceful Affair: The junior Editor of ZLucifer'In Hoc, VALLEY FALLS NEW ERA,
Sept. 23, 1886.
113. Id.
114. Some Plain Words, VALLEY FALLS NEW ERA, Oct. 7, 1886.
115. WINCHESTER ARGUs, Sept. 23, 1886.
2012] 91
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
free love, anarchis[m], and socialis[m]," and for those reasons alone it
fully lived up to its reputation as "the devil himself."'16 That free-love
marriage, furthermore, was an utter travesty: "Last Sunday Walker and a
16-year old daughter of Harman made an agreement to live together as
man and wife so long as agreeable . ... This was done with the appro-
bation of the brutish father, but the people revolted.""'7 We have Moses
Harman's own stepson to thank for making sure the guilty parties were
arrested, but this is no reason to relax our vigilance: "The common and
emphatic expression is that the decent people up there ought to dump
the outfit into the Delaware [River], and drive the gang who run it out
of town..il8
While these were neighboring newspapers, their calls for vigilante
justice neatly captured the tone of the press coverage across .the rest of
Kansas. The Topeka Daily Capital, the state's leading newspaper, con-
demned the marriage as having been celebrated "according to the free
love creed.""' The Kansas Democrat, the other major daily published in
Topeka, summed up their editorial judgment well with the headline, "A
Smell of Brimstone." 20 The Troy Chief edited by a state senator named
Sol Miller, opined:
[Valley Falls] has more murders, more mobs, more vice, more
scoundrels, than our whole county. For years, it has had a soci-
ety of Spiritualists, Infidels, Free Lovers, and other kindred
isms, that scandalized the whole community. Of late they have
added Socialism and Anarchy to their attractions. They have
had a newspaper called LUCIFER, and the carryings on have
been of the Lucifer kind.121
The attacks on Edwin and Lillian extended to other corners of the
country. Thanks to Lucifer, the Chicago Daily Times opined, Valley Falls
now "'shines and stinks, and stinks and shines, like a rotten mackerel by
moonlight.' ,122 Lillian and Edwin presumed to set themselves above the




119. Free Love, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, Sept. 21, 1886.
120. A Smell ofBrimstone, KANSAS DEMOCRAT, Sept. 21, 1886.
121. See Kansas Liberty and justice: To jail and There, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct.
15, 1886 (quoting the Troy Chief).
122. See LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 8, 1886 (quoting the Chicago Daily Times,
which borrowed from John Randolph's condemnation of Henry Clay after the Mis-
souri Compromise); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE DEMOCRATS: FROM JEFFERSON
TO CLINTON 51 (1995).
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rule of law, and this, the Times lamented, is the first step the terrorists
and the "'dynamite butchers'" all take.12 3 The essay urged on the "exter-
mination" of the group. 24
b. Radical Voices
Moses Harman was not some mere unarmed victim of this news-
paper onslaught. After all, he edited his own newspaper, and he sought
to rally a counter-attack as best he knew how: by using Lucifer's editorial
pages to defend freedom in marriage.
Moses consistently appealed to the cause of women's rights in his
defense of Edwin and Lillian's marriage. Consider marital rape, Moses
wrote. So long as the law forces husbands and wives to remain together
against their wills, we shall be cursed and blighted by marital rape. A
wife caught in such unfortunate circumstances "may [be] subject[ed] ...
to legal rape every day or night of the year, and the law provides abso-
lutely no redress."'25 The only cure for this social illness was freedom.126
Since he ran a newspaper with a national circulation, Moses was
able to open Lucifer's pages to guest columnists, allowing writers from
around the country to weigh in. If the local press wanted to poison the
atmosphere in Kansas, perhaps outside voices needed to be heard. One
of Harman's most important allies was Caroline Severance, the daughter
of a prominent New England banker who had married an even wealthi-
er, more prominent Midwestern banker, Theodoric Severance.'12 The
two of them had recently relocated to California, where Caroline im-
mersed herself in a wide range of affairs-from founding the first
kindergarten in California, 12 to becoming one of that state's foremost
campaigners for women's rights.129
Severance now threw in completely behind Edwin and Lillian's
marriage. "True love needs no civil law," she wrote, "for love itself is the
123. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 8, 1886.
124. Id.
125. Moses Harman, AutonomySef-Law, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Sept. 24, 1886
(emphasis in original).
126. Id.
127. MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN, THE PART TAKEN BY WOMEN IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 413
(1912).
128. TERESA S. NEAL, EVOLUTION TOWARD EQUALITY: EQUALITY FOR WOMEN IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 18 (2006).
129. Important biographical details can be found in THE MOTHER OF CLUBS: CAROLINE
M. SEYMOUR SEVERANCE: AN ESTIMATE AND APPRECIATION (Ella Giles Ruddy ed.,
1906); VIRGINIA ELWOOD-AKERS, CAROLINE SEVERANCE (2010).
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strongest incentive to assist and protect the one on whom it rests."so
Only the loveless marriage needed "the restraining or compulsory pow-
er" of the law, and that is precisely the sort of union that deserves to be
denounced as a sham.' Edwin and Lillian were to be "congratulate[d]"
on their "courage" and their "daring to be free."132
Nor was Severance alone. Moses published a comforting editorial
from Thaddeus Burr Wakeman, a leading New York City lawyer who
also served as the President of the Humanity Society and the New York
Liberal Club, and was active generally in the cause of civil liberties.'
"Personal liberty," Wakeman wrote, urging Edwin and Lillian to perse-
vere, "is the fundamental liberty-the only liberty worth suffering for or
dying for, and I hope that you will persist until the laws that imprison
you are repealed out of shame."'
Sada Bailey Fowler also warmly commended Edwin and Lillian, de-
fending Lillian's free choice in particular: "In substance, [Lillian] has
said, 'I love true virtue so well that I vow to never exercise my conjugali-
ty [save] only in the purest and truest love.' "" A Philadelphia feminist
of real significance, Fowler was fresh off a major publishing success. Her
novel Irene, which argued for the final victory of free love and the aboli-
tion of conventional marriage, had created something of a sensation.
The book was widely and heavily-though quite caustically and unfa-
vorably-reviewed in some of the nation's leading literary magazines.136
Now she wished to inject herself squarely into the Lillian/Edwin contro-
versy.
c. "Freedom of Choice"
It was in this crisis atmosphere, in this desire to rally to the side of
two people arrested simply for arranging their own sexual affairs as they
130. C. Severance, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 29, 1886.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Thaddeus Burr Wakeman, 17 FREE THOUGHT MAG. 589 (1889) (providing important
biographical detail).
134. T.B. Wakeman, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 26, 1886.
135. Sada Bailey Fowler, An Open Letter to Lillian Harman, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER,
Oct. 8, 1886.
136. It was widely-and savagely attacked-in a number of prominent publications, in-
cluding Books of the Month, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar., 1887, at 431; Book
Talk, 43 LPPINCOrr's MONTHLY MAG. 463, 607 (April 1889). Benjamin Tucker's
magazine published two reviews, one critical, one favorable. See Dotie Case, Irene: or,
The Road to Freedom, LIBERTY, Nov. 20, 1886, at 7; Another View of "Irene", LIBERTY,
Nov. 20, 1886, at 7.
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wished, that a- familiar vocabulary began to emerge at least in rudimen-
tary form. "The 'public,'" Edwin Walker wrote, "has no business to
come prying into my ... bedroom."' He declared that his relationship
with Lillian was a part of a larger right of "Human Association."' "Sex
association," he noted, was an aspect of this larger human right, and the
state could not infringe upon it.
A medical doctor from Kansas City asserted that Lillian and Edwin
had the right "of minding their own business in their own way.""o Any
rules superimposed by the state, she insisted, amounted to "Despot-
ism.""' John Kelso from Colorado asserted that sexual relations between
consenting adults cause no injury and violate the rights of no third par-
ty.142 Edwin and Lillian must therefore be left alone to enjoy their sexual
relations in the way they see fit.
Other writers focused on the impact this debate should have on the
reproductive rights of women. "Woman," Lucinda Chandler wrote, em-
phasizing every word, "should control her function of motherhood."43 The
state's marriage laws infringed on this freedom and were thus ripe for
reversal or repeal.144 Moses agreed. The case, he asserted, was all about
"the right of woman to the ownership and control of her sex-hood and
of her maternal functions." 4s He added in a later column: "[T]he
Emancipation of Woman as to her Sex-hood and Motherhood is the
PIVOTAL ISSUE. "Let woman be individualized-let her own herself
137. Edwin C. Walker, Kansas Liberty and justice: To Jail and There, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-
BEARER, Sept. 24, 1886.
138. Id.
139. "Sex association is a natural, a necessary act-necessary to the fullest happiness of
men and women, and necessary to the continued existence of the race on this planet."
If "two persons, a man and a woman, of mature age and sound mind, decide of their
own free will and choice to live together," Edwin asserted, the State has no power
over the regulation of that relationship. Edwin C. Walker, Autonomy-SelfLaw:
What Are Its Demands?, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Sep. 14, 1886.
140. C. Lona Marsters, Despotism, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886.
141. Id
142. John Kelso, That Marriage: To the 'Outraged' Christians of Valley Falls, Kansas, Luci-
FER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 15, 1886.
143. Lucinda B. Chandler, Compensation, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 5, 1886.
144. Id.
145. Moses Harman, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 17, 1886. A Philadelphia corre-
spondent agreed and added: "Give to woman her natural right to rest in the arms of
love where she loves, without the curse of pope or priest upon her." Milda Thorne,
Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 24, 1886.
146. Moses Harman, The Main Issue, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Jan. 28, 1887 (capital-
ized in original).
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in marriage, as well as out of it, and there will not be so many unwel-
come children born as now."
Lillian herself summarized this spirit of liberty and self-direction in
a letter expressing gratitude for the support she received: "We thank
you, kind friends and comrades, for your words of sympathy and the
'ammunition' you have sent to help us carry on this battle for freedom
of Choice and Contract."' Moses, expanding on his daughter's word
choice, reflected on the expression "freedom of choice." "Freedom of
Choice," he wrote, capitalizing the terms, "is a natural right." Choice,
he argued, is as instinctively human as our emotions and our senses-
"seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, smelling, digesting, loving, hating,
living and dying."' The law, he asserted, cannot control these other
impulses, and therefore should not control our sexual and reproductive
decisions. "o Moses had made these points before, but now there was an
urgency to his message, faced as he was with the imprisonment of his
daughter and her lover, who was also his junior editor."'
Lillian and Moses' usage. captured both more and less 'than the
modern understanding of "freedom of choice." They intended to em-
brace all of the choices a woman makes in the sexual sphere-whether
to marry, to have sexual relations, or to beget and bear a child. They did
not focus expressly on the right to abortion or contraception, but on
147. Id. Moses submitted a letter to the editor of the Kansas City Times expanding on
these themes, hoping to find a receptive audience in a more mainstream publication,
but the paper rejected him, stating that "[a]n argument for greater feminine freedom
in the marriage relation might possibly contain something of interest, though the
subject has been pretty well exhausted." Moses Harman, The Harman Case, LUCIFER
THE LIGHT-BEARER, Feb. 4, 1887.
148. Lillian Harman, To Our Friends, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 8, 1886.
149. Moses Harman, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886.
150. The "conjugal relation" in all its aspects, Moses added, is also an aspect of "Freedom
of Contract," the capacity every person of sound mind and judgment has to make
choices. Id. Parties have the right, Moses claimed, to form sexual unions "in their
own way," and the law cannot interfere with this right. Moses Harman, LUCIFER THE
LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 10, 1886.
151. In October 1881, Moses wrote, in one of the earliest issues of his newspaper:
"[Woman must] be allowed the entire CONTROL OF HER OWN PERSON, That
is, we demand that in that most sacred of all Human Relations-that most Holy
(shall we say Divine?) of Human Functions, the Creative function of Motherhood,
she shall be allowed to Decide for Herself as to When, how Often, and under what
Conditions she shall assume this Relation and perform this Function." Moses Har-
man, What We Demand for Woman, KANSAs LIBERAL, Oct. 1881 (capitalized in
original).
96 [Vol. 19:71
THE DEVIL COMES TO KANSAS
sexual liberty generally. The state, they maintained, could not legislate a
single prescriptive morality over any of these matters.15
Lillian and Edwin, however, faced problems with these efforts to
frame and nationalize their struggle with the Kansas authorities. They
were not trying to win some abstract debate about legal theory or public
policy. No, they had much more immediate concerns: they were sched-
uled to go trial before a jury of their peers, in Valley Falls, and that town
was boiling over with rage.
2. The Defense Team
a. David Overmyer
As the Wakeman letter suggested, Lillian and Edwin spent most of
their time prior to trial in Oskaloosa, in the county jail located in that
community.'" With remarkable speed, Moses was able to secure some of
the best legal representation available in the State of Kansas to defend
the two free lovers-David Overmyer (1847-1907) and G.C. Clemens
(1849-1906).'" That Moses was able to retain the services of such men,
on such short notice, speaks highly of the political connections he had
managed to cultivate in Kansas. He might have been seen as something
akin to the devil by many of his neighbors,'" but he did have some
friends in high places.
152. What she and Edwin did in marrying was nothing other than "mind] our own busi-
ness." Harman, supra note 149. She and Edwin had no "need' to marry before a state
magistrate and the State cannot force them to. Lillian Harman, The Woman 's View of
It, LucIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886. (emphasis in original). Lillian insist-
ed: "[I]f they want to prosecute, they can just prosecute, and make the most of it." Id.
153. Walker, it seems, was imprisoned almost immediately after marriage, being allowed
by the sheriff to spend an evening comforting his mother-who lived with Moses
Harman-before being taken to the Jefferson County Jail, in Oskaloosa. Lillian was
initially released to the custody of her father Moses, but was finally confined to the
Oskaloosa jail in early October, where she remained until the completion of her sen-
tence and the payment of court costs. On the chronology and conditions of
confinement, see Edwin C. Walker, Kansas Liberty and Justice: To jail and There, Lu-
CIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 15, 1886.
154. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 1, 1886.
155. In the spring of 1883, Moses was invited to address a gathering of the National Re-
form Association in Valley Falls. This organization, dedicated to amending the
Preamble of the United States Constitution to acknowledge the supremacy of the Bi-
ble and God's law, reacted in outrage to Moses' presence, denouncing him as the
Devil and "Beelzebub." Moses, it seems, chose to name his newly-conceived newspa-
per Lucifer in part in order to embrace the name his neighbors had placed on him. See
Reid, supra note 3.
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Overmyer enjoyed a career both remarkable and colorful, even by
frontier standards. He was the Democratic nominee for Governor in
1894, stood for election to the United States Senate in 1901 (carrying
every Democratic vote in a day when legislatures still elected senators),
and ran again as the Democratic nominee for Attorney General in
1906.'6 He played a central role in the Democratic National Conven-
tion of 1904, giving the nominating speech endorsing General Nelson
Miles for President of the United States.' 7 Before becoming a Demo-
cratic Party stalwart, he had been aligned with the Populists. He was
even instrumental in coining the term "Populist Party" prior to the 1892
election."' Overmyer thereby bequeathed to generations of American
political writers a basic part of their vocabulary.
Overmyer was attorney of record in a number of high-profile cases,
foremost among them a constitutional challenge to Kansas' prohibition
law that went to the United States Supreme Court.'" Kansas, in a stun-
ning burst of evangelical. fervor, had adopted in 1880 the nation's first
constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of in-
toxicating beverages."' Best to make prohibition part of the organic law
of the land, it was reasoned.' 6' Statutes might be amended or repealed,
but constitutional amendments endure forever.162
Overmyer's challenge to this unprecedented step was grounded on
the Commerce Clause; other states had not enacted prohibitory consti-
tutional amendments and Congress had acted in the area. By adopting
an amendment at such variance with national experience, Kansas was
interfering with interstate trade.'63 The Court, however, rejected this
156. KAN. HISTORICAL Soc'Y, Biography, in DAVID OVERMYER PAPERS, 1879-[19711,
available at http://www.kshs.org/p/david-overmyer-papers- 1879-1971-bulk-1879-
1907/14095 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
157. Milton W. Blumenberg, OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION 200-07 (1904). Miles would lose the nomination to New York Ap-
peals Court Judge Alton B. Parker.
158. 0. GENE CLANTON, A COMMON HUMANITY: KANSAS POPULISM AND THE BATTLE
FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, 1854-1903, at 144 (2004).
159. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
160. ROBERT Sm BADER, PROHIBITION IN KANSAS: A HISTORY 36-62 (1986) (discuss-
ing the circumstances leading up to the adoption of the nation's first prohibition
amendment).
161. H. EDWARD FLENTIE & JOSEPH A. AISTRUP, KANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT:
THE CLASH OF POLITICAL CULTURES 15 (2010).
162. BADER, supra note 160, at 40-41.
163. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 550-54 (argument of counsel).
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theory, reasoning that the state's police power, on the question of the
regulation of alcohol at least, trumped Commerce Clause concerns.
In 1904, Overmyer litigated one of the nation's first school-prayer
cases."' A young student had been expelled from public school for refus-
ing to recite the Lord's Prayer and the Twenty-Third Psalm. 66 Overmyer
asserted that mandatory Bible readings violated the student's state consti-
tutional right to be free of governmental compulsion in "any form of
worship."' 7 The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that Overmyer's
interpretation could well be correct had the legislature been religiously
motivated,168 but it then asserted that the Bible readings were not intend-
ed as worship but rather aimed at inculcating in students "a more acute
sense of right and wrong" and so should be upheld for that reason."6
Overmyer's caseload ranged from torts, to mortgages, to property
disputes, insurance settlements,'7 1 criminal defense work,'74 and the oth-
er basic elements of a substantial and prominent private legal practice in
the late-nineteenth-century. 7 ' Thanks to his political connections, Over-
myer was also frequently called upon to represent disputants in matters
such as contested elections,'76 breaches of government contracts, or acts
164. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 550-54. Overmyer also litigated Kansas state court cases
involving the prohibition laws, where local officials had been accused of refusing to
enforce the law.
165. See Billard v. Bd. of Educ., 76 P. 422 (Kan. 1904).
166. Billard, 76 P. at 422.
167. Billard, 76 P. at 422-23.
168. Billard, 76 P. at 422-23.
169. Billard, 76 P. at 423.
170. See, e.g., Holloway v. McIntosh, 51 P. 563 (Kan. Ct. App. 1898) (representing a
group of persons injured in a reckless horse-riding incident).
171. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Belknap Say. Bank, 35 P. 792 (Kan. 1894).
172. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Bales, 52 P. 447 (Kan. 1898).
173. See, e.g., Kansas Home Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 23 P. 1061 (Kan. 1890); Barney v. Dud-
ley, 21 P. 1079 (Kan. 1889).
174. See, e.g., State v. McAnarney, 79 P. 137 (Kan. 1905) (appeal of a murder conviction);
State v. Douglass, 26 P. 176 (Kan. 1891) (appeal of conviction for placing obstruc-
tion on railroad tie); State v. Matthews, 25 P. 36 (Kan. 1890) (appeal of conviction
for check fraud).
175. See, e.g., Walker v. Miller, 59 F. 869 (8th Cit. 1894) (distribution of corporate assets
upon corporate dissolution); Heitman v. Griffith, 23 P. 589 (Kan. 1890) (action to
dissolve a partnership); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 78 P. 861
(Kan. 1904) (representing a contractor suing the Railway for breach of contract).
176. See, e.g., Hughes v. Parker, 65 P. 265 (Kan. 1901) (disputed mayoral election for
City of Topeka); Lawrence v. Leidigh, 50 P. 600 (Kan. 1896) (disputed election for
county clerk); Simpson v. Osborn, 34 P. 747 (Kan. 1893) (disputed judicial elec-
tion).
177. See, e.g., Petillon v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 48 P. 1002 (Kan. Ct. App. 1897) (breach of
contract with government printer).
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of official misconduct.'7 1 Overmyer might be described as an activist
lawyer, but he was also very much a member of the legal and political
establishments of his day. Lillian and Edwin were very well-served to
have him on their team.
b. G.C. Clemens
If Overmyer can be understood easily enough as an energetic but
ultimately rather conventional politically-engaged lawyer, it is far more
difficult to find words for the eclectic and enigmatic G.C. Clemens. The
G.C. stood for "Gaspar Christopher," two names Clemens richly des-
pised and only used in the direst necessity. He fancied himself a relative
of the more famous Samuel Clemens (who took the pen name Mark
Twain). He tried to dress like Twain, grew the same mustache, combed
his hair in the same ridiculous jumble, cultivated an entertaining and
dry sense of humor; but, alas, his. better-known namesake never
acknowledged his presence.17 His biographers truthfully wrote: "Re-
formers of the late nineteenth century have been viewed, then and now,
as a peculiar lot. G.C. Clemens was perhaps one of the most delightfully
peculiar of them all." 80
A brilliant man, probably a child prodigy, Clemens taught school as
a teenager and was admitted to the practice of law at the age of twen-
ty. Unlike Overmyer, who saw the law as a vehicle for personal
advancement and ambition, Clemens was interested in the law as an
intellectual enterprise. At the age of twenty-eight, he authored a major
treatise on the law of corporate securities.m1 2 Sensing the opportunity for
humor, he introduced the book:
We live in a glorious country. Here, every man is a king, and
has the privilege of being as untrammeled by reason and re-
sponsibility as any who ever wore a crown or sat upon a
178. See, e.g., In re Davis, 49 P. 160 (Kan. 1897) (challenge to the investigative powers of
a legislative committee examining allegations of bribery in the Kansas House and
Senate); In re Gunn, 32 P. 470 (Kan. 1893) (habeas corpus proceeding brought by
legislator arrested for legislative contempt).
179. These biographical details can be found in Michael J. Brodhead & 0. Gene Clanton,
G.C Clemens: The "Sociable Socialist, "40 KAN. HIsT. Q. 475-502 (1974).
180. Id. at 475.
181. Orval G. Clanton, Kansas Populists: A Study in the Leadership and Ideology of the
Kansas Peoples' Party 57 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State Uni-
versity) (on file with author).
182. G.C. CLEMENS, THE LAW OF CORPORATE SECURITIES AS DECIDED IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1877).
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throne.... Perhaps . . . there is no greater privilege enjoyed by
the American citizen than that simple but successful scheme of
robbery which consists in the exercise of the right of suffrage,
by means of which the man who owns no landed property
save what adheres to his person, and no goods and chattels
save a family he mistreats, and a vote which is in a perennial
state of hypothecation, dictates to the hard-working and mon-
eyed classes who shall officially squander their money,
contracts debts for them to pay, and then complains at the de-
parture of flush times when the last farthing is needed to pay
off the mortgages his prodigality has placed upon the homes
and businesses of honest and thrifty citizens.'
The gist of this statement is less a political program than a kind of
cheerful, youthful impudence-the work product of a twenty-something,
self-absorbed legal prodigy who delighted in causing political indigestion.
As he aged, however, his work took on serious, practical dimensions. His
treatise A Manual of the Law of Roads and Highways in the State of Kansas
was a practical handbook directed at local governments charged with plot-
ting the direction and course of the state's highways and went through
three editions in Clemens' lifetime.' He also served for a while as Re-
porter of the Kansas Supreme Court. In that capacity, he wrote a second
leading practical handbook, Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
Supreme Court of Kansas, which was published in 1885, a year before
Edwin and Lillian's free-love marriage."8
Nevertheless, Clemens was never really able to achieve an entirely
serious demeanor. He edited a humor magazine called "The Whim
Wham."' 6 He wrote an essay in praise of that Greek poetess from the
Island of Lesbos, Sappho."' He wrote another essay celebrating the
many accomplishments of Satan: "According to his bitterest enemies and
most persistent detractors, not only is Satan about the biggest and hot-
test person in the universe, but he has given the world all the happiness
and all the progress it enjoys." 88
183. Id. at 19.
184. G.C. CLEMENS, A MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ROADS AND HIGHWAYS IN THE STATE OF
KANSAS (3d ed. 1892).
185. G.C. CLEMENS, APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF KANSAS (1885).
186. As he described his role, "Edited by G.C. Clemens, and published on credit. Mort-
gage not yet placed." THE WHIM WHAM, Oct. 9, 1880.
187. G.C. Clemens, Sappho, THE WHIM WHAM, Nov. 6, 1880.
188. G.C. Clemens, Satan, the Boss Knocker, in 1 THE KANSAS KNOCKER 29 (1900).
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Like Overmyer, Clemens could be a leading lawyer, at least when he
put his mind to it. He either argued or was on the briefs of five United
States Supreme Court cases from 1876, when he was only twenty-seven,
to 1904.1'9 As did Overmyer, Clemens took cases involving political dis-
putes.190 He also represented defendants charged with violating the
prohibition laws. 9 '
But Clemens was more willing than Overmyer to take on contro-
versial cases lacking any apparent personal political advantage. On at
least two occasions, he represented African-American clients who sought
to have their children admitted to "white-only" schools in Kansas' segre-
gated educational environment.192 And he was a zealous advocate for
economically-oppressed clients facing foreclosure proceedings or other
forms of onerous debt collection.
By 1900, Clemens had become a committed socialist, writing trea-
tises for Eugene Victor Debs' publishing firm. He argued passionately
that the state must take a leading role in seeing to the economic welfare
of its citizens: "Why not use government---municipal, state, national,
each in its proper sphere-as the agency through which the people may
cooperate with one another? This is precisely what Socialists propose." 94
The impression one has of Clemens today is of an intensely bright,
self-confident, brash, iconoclastic man sufficiently nimble in thought
and speech to make himself at home in courtrooms and before the pub-
lic at large despite views that were exceedingly unconventional, at least
when measured against many of his contemporaries. That Moses was
able to secure two such gifted and connected lawyers for Lillian's and
Edwin's defense leaves one marveling at the strength of his own political
connections.
189. Am. Book Co. v. Kansas, 193 U.S. 49 (1904); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Lewis, 133
U.S. 198 (1890); Hentig v. Page, 102 U.S. 219 (1880); Butterfield v. Smith, 101
U.S. 570 (1879); Humboldt Twp. v. Long, 92 U.S. 642 (1875).
190. See, e.g., Shellabarger v. Williamson, 32 P. 132 (Kan. 1893); Wilds v. State Bd. of
Canvassers, 32 P. 136 (Kan. 1893); Rice v. Bd. of Canvassers, 32 P. 134 (Kan.
1893). All three cases involved disputed election returns.
191. See, e.g., City of Topeka v. Kersch, 80 P. 29 (Kan. 1905); State v. Durein, 78 P. 152
(Kan. 1904); State v. Engleman, 71 P. 859 (Kan. 1903); In re Semple, 62 P. 534
(Kan. App. 1900).
192. See Cartwright v. Bd. of Educ., 84 P. 382 (Kan. 1906); Reynolds v. Bd. of Educ., 72
P. 274 (Kan. 1903).
193. See, e.g., Morris v. German, 14 Kan. 221 (1875); First Nat'l Bank v. Warner, 22
Kan. 537 (1879); Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 23 Kan. 44 (1879); Snavely v. Ab-
bott Buggy Co., 12 P. 522 (Kan. 1887); Tefft v. Citizens' Bank, 13 P. 783 (Kan.
1887); Dendy v. First Nat'l Bank, 71 P. 830 (Kan. 1903).
194. G.C. CLEMENS, A PRIMER ON SocaLIsM 11 (1900) (emphasis in original).
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Retaining counsel of this stature not only took political connec-
tions, it also took money. And to that end, Moses established a defense
fund which he monitored with care and about which he posted regular
updates in Lucifer. Contributions flowed in from every corner of the
nation.' A number of leading radical authors also contributed bulk
quantities of their works for resale by Lucifer, augmenting the cash flow
that was needed to maintain a credible defense.'96
3. The Prosecution: William F. Gilluly
The prosecution was not able to match the defense team in bril-
liance or prominence, but it had managed to secure counsel that was
more than competent. William F. Gilluly, the County Attorney for Jef-
ferson County, in which Valley Falls was located, prosecuted the case. A
Civil War veteran who was born in Clinton, Michigan and who enlisted
as a private in the 11th Michigan Cavalry in September, 1863, a month
before his seventeenth birthday, Gilluly saw heavy action in the "West-
ern Department."07
His unit was among those assigned the inglorious task of patrolling
and policing the State of Kentucky where it helped to uproot the indig-
enous guerrilla movement that had sprung up in support of the
Confederate cause.' It was reported that the unit hanged many of the
more intransigent rebel irregulars'99 and then proceeded, at the end of
195. The Defence Fund, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 5, 1886, reported donations
from some 23 states and territories-including Connecticut, New York, Delaware,
Florida, Texas, Montana, and California. The donation list for November 26 re-
ported contributions from some 27 states. See The Defence Fund, LUCIFER THE
LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 26, 1886.
196. Sada Bailey Fowler contributed six copies of her novel Irene. On Fowler, see supra
note 135-and accompanying text. Ezra Heywood donated twenty copies of his Cu-
pid's Yoke. On Heywood, see infra notes 302-17 and accompanying text. Dr. Juliet
Severance, a Milwaukee medical doctor, donated thirty copies of a debate she partici-
pated in on The Social Question. On Severance, see 3 MARY A. LIVERMORE &
FRANCES E. WILLARD, A WOMAN OF THE CENTURY: 1470 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
OF LEADING AMERICAN WOMEN 642-43 (1893). The father-and-son team of doctors,
Edward Bliss and Edward Bond Foote, donated 25 copies of their Plain Home Talk.
On the Footes, see generally JANICE RUTH WOOD, THE STRUGGLE FOR FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1872-1915: EDWARD BLISS FOOTE, EDWARD BOND FOOTE,
AND ANTI-COMSTOCK OPERATIONS (2008).
197. William G. Cutler, Jefferson County, Part 12: Biographical Sketches (Albert-Huron),
in HISTORY OF THE STATE OF KANSAS (1883), available athttp://www.kancoll.org/
books/cutler/jefferson/jefferson-co-p 1 2.htmi.
198. 3 THE UNION ARMY: STATES AND REGIMENTS 428-29 (1908).
199. The Eleventh Cavalry, during its time in Kentucky, was under the general command
of Stephen Burbridge. In the fall of 1864, Burbridge issued a command to his officers
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1864 and beginning of 1865, on what became known as "Stoneman's
Raid"-a bloody march through eastern Tennessee, southwest Virgin-
ia, and western North Carolina that was charged with the destruction
of Southern infrastructure. Anything that might give the rebels solace,
support, or sustenance-roads, bridges, railroad tracks, food supplies,
warehouses, and storage depots-got swept up into the destructive
f200frenzy.
In March, 1865, a month before the War's close, an eighteen-year-
old Gilluly was commissioned a second lieutenant and transferred to the
Sixth Colored Cavalry, where he served as a white officer.20' The African-
American units were special targets of Confederate fury and accepted
only volunteers who knew full well the risks that entailed.202 The white
officers who commanded such units were subject to summary hanging if
captured by the Confederates. 203 Gilluly's service in this unit spoke vol-
umes about his sense of duty, his integrity, and his heightened maturity
for someone so young.
An inner sense of obligation to the law must have counted a good
deal with Gilluly. After all, it is likely his sympathies were with Moses
Harman-he was a subscriber to Lucifer the Light-Bearer and is on rec-
ord as having made at least one gift to the newspaper.204 But he was a
and troops that henceforward he considered it a serious crime for any of his men to
capture alive any Kentucky guerrilla. He indicated that the war was to be fought un-
der the "black flag," meaning no quarter given to any foe. See MICHIGAN IN THE WAR
734 (John Roberson ed., 1882). Earlier that summer, General Burbridge issued Or-
der 59, which decreed that "'When an unarmed Union citizen is murdered, four
guerrillas will be selected from the prisoners in the hands of the military authorities
and publicly shot to death in the most convenient place near the scene of the out-
rage.' See THOMAS SHELBY WATSON & PERRY A. BRANTLEY, CONFEDERATE
GUERRILLA SUE MUNDY: A BIOGRAPHY OF KENTUCKY SOLDIER JEROME CLARK 29
(2008); cf BRYAN S. BUSH, BUTCHER BURBRIDGE: UNION GENERAL STEPHEN BUR-
BRIDGE AND His REIGN OF TERROR OVER KENTUCKY (2008) (documenting
Burbridge's campaign of terror across Kentucky).
200. CHRIS J. HARTLEY, STONEMAN'S RAID, 1865, at 3-36 (2010) (detailing the early parts
of the Raid, in which Gilluly would have participated).
201. MICH. ADJUDANT-GENERAL'S DEPT., RECORD OF SERVICE OF MICHIGAN VOLUN-
TEERS IN THE CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865, at 42 (1865); cf BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE
NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR (1953) (discussing the use of white officers in African-
American regiments during the Civil War).
202. MARK LARDAS, AFRICAN-AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE CIVIL WAR 15 (2006). Volun-
teering for service in an African-American regiment was often a quicker way to
promotion than service in white units, which might have been motivation for the
eighteen-year-old Gilluly's decision. Id.
203. GREGORY J.W. URWIN, BLACK FLAG OVER DIXIE: RACIAL ATROCITIES AND REPRISALS
IN THE CIVIL WAR 80 (2005) (summary hanging of white officers).
204. See Donor List, KANSAS LIBERAL, Dec. 1, 1882.
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lawyer with a job to do, and he would not let mere personal preferences
interfere with his solemn legal duties.
Gilluly was not a prominent name in Kansas legal circles. He never
argued a case before the United States Supreme Court, he never authored
a treatise, and his caseload, at least that revealed by the twenty-some years
of Kansas reports in which his name appears, shows him to be a lawyer of
mostly local significance.205 Indeed, he was appearing in State v. Walker in
his capacity as County Attorney. But it would be a mistake to underesti-
mate his abilities, as his performance in this case reveals a tough and
well-trained legal mind, willing and able to engage in zealous prosecu-
tion.
4. The Judge: Robert Crozier
Judge Robert Crozier (1827-1895) was one of those northerners
who arrived in Kansas from Ohio in the 1850s in the midst of the great
struggle over slavery. He started a newspaper in Leavenworth, came to
the attention of the Republican Party, and was appointed by Abraham
20)6
Lincoln to the position of the United States Attorney for Kansas. In
November, 1863, in the midst of the Civil War, he was elected Chief
Justice of the Kansas Supreme Court, a position he held for three
years.207 He left the court to take a position as a bank executive, and
eventually left the private sector when appointed to complete the term
of United States Senator Alexander Caldwell, who resigned in March
1873 when confronted with overwhelming evidence of bribe-taking.208
205. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. Nos. 70 & 98 v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 56 P. 479 (Kan. 1899) (tax-
payers' cause of action seeking adjustment to school district boundaries); Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Smith, 55 P. 272 (Kan. 1898) (suit for wrongful ter-
mination and malicious prosecution); Haenky v. Weishaar, 52 P. 437 (Kan. 1898)
(property dispute involving a pre-nuptial agreement); Hunt v. Insley, 42 P. 709
(Kan. 1895) (probate dispute); Montague v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 53 P. 145 (Kan. 1888)
(suit to enjoin a drainage ditch diverting water from farm fields); Atchison, Topeka,
& Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Wilhelm, 6 P. 273 (Kan. 1885) (action for taxes brought
against the railroad); Comm'rs of Jefferson Cnry. v. Hudson, 20 Kan. 71 (1878)
(dispute over local farm subsidies); Kemper v. Lord, 49 P. 638 (Kan. Ct. App. 1897)
(mortgage dispute).
206. J. Morgan Kousser, Before Pessy, Before Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial
Integration in Louisiana and Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 213, 266 n.130 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds.,
2009).
207. Henry Inman, The Supreme Court ofKansas, 4 THE GREEN BAG 321, 327 (1892).
208. MARK GROSSMAN, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SCANDALS, POWER, AND GREED 44 (2003). Crozier, who had an untainted record of
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Following his term in the Senate, Crozier felt the urge to return to judi-
cial life, serving four consecutive terms as a state trial court judge.209
Crozier displayed both a remarkable sense of self and a truly awe-
some independence during his time on the Supreme Court and in his
tenure as a district-court judge. His irony and sarcasm were sharpened
to a diamond-edged intensity. Rebuking counsel, he once wrote: "The
question presented in this case has been twice decided by this court,...
but as counsel do not seem to be satisfied, the court has thought it
proper to add a third, thus endeavoring to compensate in quantity any
defect in quality."210 Or, again: "If the Legislature did not deliberately
intend to abolish appeals from the Probate Court, it is to be regretted
that it was not more careful in its action upon the subject." 21  Another
time, he grumbled about having to rule on a statute of limitations ques-
tion when the "heat [was] 98 degrees of Fahrenheit, in the shade." 212
But Crozier was far more than an entertaining old curmudgeon.
There is a fearlessness to his decisions that even contemporary judges
could profit from. In a homicide trial, the defense attempted to disquali-
fy the testimony of a witness simply because she worked as a
213
prostitute. Crozier rejected the argument, finding it to be "a very
harsh rule . . . and entirely indefensible by any process of reasoning that
this court can conceive of." 2 14 In the spring of 1881, he condemned the
state's newly-enacted prohibition amendment as itself unconstitutional
(a conclusion that was reversed upon appeal).215 In 1889, three years af-
ter State v. Walker, Crozier issued a writ of mandamus ordering the
admission of African-American students to the schools of the small town
ofToganoxie.216
Crozier, in short, was a judge both sharp-tongued and capable of
bold action. Although he had a keen sense of the justice of a case, he did
not appreciate overly-moralistic arguments, as shown both in the prosti-
tute's case and in the prohibition case. He would expect a high level of
probity, nevertheless served as Caldwell's defense counsel after charges were preferred
against him in the United States Senate. Id.
209. He served as First District Judge, headquartered in Leavenworth, but he often had
occasion to sit in Jefferson County, only thirty or so miles west, as Circuit Court
Judge. See George W. Martin, A Chapter From The Archives, 12 KAN. HIsT. COLLEC-
TIONs 359, 365 (identifying Crozier as judge in the first judicial district of Kansas).
210. White-Crow v. White-Wing, 3 Kan. 276, 278-279 (1865).
211. Renter v. Bauer, 3 Kan. 503, 505 (1866).
212. Searle v. Adams, 3 Kan. 515, 518 (1866).
213. Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450 (1866).
214. Id. at 480.
215. D.W. WILDER, THE ANNALS OF KANSAS 952 (1886).
216. Kousser, supra note 206 at 236, 266, n.130.
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On the morning of October 14, 1886, the date set for Edwin and
Lillian's trial, Clemens and Overmyer committed what may well have
been a tactical error by moving for a change of venue based on the
high level of prejudice that existed in Jefferson County against the de-
fendants. Clemens and Overmyer asserted that the county's
newspapers had been relentless in their campaign against Edwin, Lilli-
an, and Moses and created a climate of hatred. An "impartial trial by
jury," they maintained, was impossible."'
Appended to the motion were clippings of the various negative
news stories published around the county. Many of the stories refer-
enced above were included, as well other material that had recently
appeared in the local press. Edwin Walker was the "free-love crank"
who "howls about free speech like a regular Chicago anarchist." 2 18 The
Oskaloosa Sickle lamented that the arresting officers did not go far
enough. The ringleader of the whole group, Moses Harman, remained
at large, and it was about time he was rounded up.219 "[G]iv[e] them a
kick on their down hill road," the paper urged.220
All of this vitriol, Overmyer and Clemens alleged, led to actual
physical violence-"zealous and malicious persons" had actually at-
tacked Edwin and Lillian.221 Vigilantism was running so wild in Valley
Falls, the motion stated, that friends of the two defendants were de-
terred from posting bail by threats of physical harm.222
All of this might have been true, but to raise it in a pre-trial mo-
tion, before a judge like Crozier, was to question his ability to control
his own courtroom. It was a motion that had no chance of success.
"The petition was denied, and the motion to dismiss overruled by the
217. Legality vs. Justice: Convicted by theJury, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 15, 1886.
218. Petition for Change of Venue and Bill of Exceptions at 18, State v. Walker, 13 P.
279 (Kan. 1887) (No. 4312) (quoting an editorial in the Argus Winchester).
219. See id. at 19 (quoting Editorial, Oskaloosa Sickle, Sept. 24, 1886) ("Now arrest the
King Bee of the tribe and close the rotten concern, and Valley Falls will smell more
like the roses than she has for many a day.").
220. Id.
221. See id. at 18.
222. Id.
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judge." 223 Crozier, however, apparently agreed to allow a detailed rec-
ord of this motion to be preserved in the Bill of Exceptions, thus
allowing for the appeal of this issue.224
2. The Trial
With the rejection of the motion, a jury was quickly impaneled.225
Moses Harman was summoned as the first witness. Lucifer the Light-
Bearer reprinted his testimony:
"I was present at the autonomistic marriage of these two per-
sons on the 19th of September and gave my consent thereto.
There was no magistrate, clergyman, or other officer of
church or state present. Not having any use for church or
state officials none such had been summoned or invited. The
parties married themselves in their own way, retaining and
recognizing all that we deem good in marriage, as commonly
understood, and eliminating that which we deem immoral,
or that which may in the future result in immorality. There
was no license from probate court exhibited on this occasion.
We regard the license and civil officer as non-essential to
marriage-that these formalities are directory to the officers
and not prohibitory as against us. We claim that we have vio-
lated no law of Kansas."226
There was an artfulness to Moses' testimony. In particular, he in-
voked a principle of statutory interpretation that was instantly
recognizable to nineteenth-century legal minds, though it has become
a mystery to many contemporary lawyers-the distinction between
directory and mandatory statutes.
J.G. Sutherland's treatise on statutory interpretation, published in
1891 and the standard text on the construction of statutes for several
generations,227 explained the difference between mandatory (or what
223. Legality vs. Justice, supra note 217.
224. Indeed, the Petition for Change of Venue is found as part of the Bill of Exceptions
today. See Petition for Change of Venue, supra note 218, at 11.
225. Legality vs. Justice, supra note 217.
226. Id.
227. Under the editorship of C. Dallas Sands and Norman J. Singer, a fourth edition of
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION by Sutherland appeared as recently as
1973. C. DALAS SANDS ET AL., STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed.
1973).
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Moses called "prohibitory") and directory statutes: "The consequential
distinction between directory and mandatory statutes is that the violation
of the former is attended with no consequences, while a failure to comply
with the requirements of the other is productive of serious results. 228
Sutherland was merely summarizing a distinction deeply embedded in the
common law. The footnotes supporting this part of his text include refer-
ences not only to American decisions but to their English antecedents. 29
Directory statutes, Sutherland assured his readers, "are not intended by
the legislature to be disregarded," 23 0 but their violation did not carry with
it the kinds of sanctions that followed in the case where one broke the
2311prohibitions of a mandatory statute.
As applied to Edwin's and Lillian's case, it was claimed that the
state had committed itself to being bound to issue marriage licenses to
whomever sought them. This was the mandatory part of the statute.
But private parties were under no obligation to seek marriage licenses
because the practice of common-law marriage survived the enactment
of the statute. The licensing statute guided engaged couples in the di-
rection of obtaining a license, but it did not command them to do so.
The danger with the mandatory/prohibitory distinction, especial-
ly the way Clemens and Overmyer deployed it, is that it might be
carried to a logical extreme. Carried too far, the distinction had the
potential to destabilize the force and effect of every statute on the
books. If many, perhaps most, statutes were open to being declared
directory-in essence, being reduced to nothing more than a legislative
recommendation or exhortation carrying no penalties for non-
compliance-there could be no predicting in advance what actions one
might safely perform under the law. There could be no telling when the
hammer of a sanction might come crashing down upon one's head. In
practice, however, these destabilizing effects were minimized through
the development of principles of interpretation that enabled courts to
discern directory from mandatory statutes, at least in the average run of
cases. Statutes relating to requirements of time, for instance, or the per-
formance of certain ministerial acts,232 were generally regarded as
228. JABEz GRIDLEY SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 573
(1891).
229. Id. at 573-99.
230. Id. at 573.
231. Id.
232. SUTHERLAND, supra note 228, at 575. Sutherland gives the example of a Michigan
case that construed a statute requiring that the township clerk "certify on or before
the first Monday of October ... the amount of the town's indebtedness ... " Id. at
576. Since the statute was directory, not mandatory, the Michigan Supreme Court
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directory, although statutes placing limitations on official powers were
usually mandatory."'
The Harmans, Walker, and their counsel clearly wished to have it
understood that the requirement to obtain a state-issued license or to
use a certain prescribed form of words was a purely ministerial function
that had no bearing on the validity of the underlying marriage. Thus the
defendants might yet be acquitted. The strategy was technically sophisti-
cated but bold within the confines of the common law: to use the arcana
of the common law to vindicate their theory of radical personal auton-
omy within marriage. Common-law marriage did not require adherence
to a particular form. Common-law marriage was an expression of per-
sonal human freedom. Statutes derogating from this common-law
commitment to freedom had to be strictly construed. The interpretive
distinction between mandatory and directory statutes was meant to pre-
serve this ancient freedom whole and entire. This meant, furthermore,
that Moses, Edwin, and Lillian now committed themselves to mounting
a traditional legal defense. They did not wish to concede that they had
engaged in a simple act of civil disobedience and they certainly did not
want to acknowledge that they should thereby receive what punishment
the state had in store for them. In their own way, they wished to contest
the legitimacy of the state's authority over marriage by relying on an-
cient legal doctrines now reinterpreted in favor of maximum personal
liberty.
One other witness was called to testify. William E Hiser, Moses'
step-son and Lillian's step-brother attested that he was invited to attend
234
the marriage and that he was in fact present to witness the occasion.
He saw Lillian and Edwin exchange their highly conditional promises,
and he saw them enter the same bedroom that night, and was even there
when they came out of it the next morning.235
When asked by Gilluly, Hiser further testified that he had heard
Moses Harman declare the night before the wedding: "This marriage
will take place regardless of law-in defiance of law."236 Moses conceded
that while he did not recall making that particular statement, "it is not
correctly affirmed as valid a certification performed a week after the deadline had
passed. Id. at 576-77 (discussing Smith v. Crittendon, 16 Mich. 152 (1867)).
233. Id. at 576-590. Sutherland gives a number of examples of mandatory statutes in
these pages-from powers granted to a corporation by its charter, to statutes protec-
tive of taxpayers, to restrictions on the exercise of government power. Id.
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impossible that something was said that made such an impression on his
mind. 
237
3. The Jury Instructions
At the close of trial, Clemens and Overmyer presented Judge Cro-
zier with a set of eight instructions they wished to have read to the
jury.238 These were not the kind of standard instructions used so often in
criminal trials today. Rather, they were argumentative. Read as a piece,
they proposed a novel theory of the case.
The instructions began by suggesting that perhaps Edwin and Lilli-
an did not actually "live together as man and wife" and so should be
acquitted for that reason. 239 After all, no proof had been adduced as to
the existence of a sexual relationship. This was merely an entryway to
their main argument: that traditional common law arguments could be
brought to bear to acquit them of all criminal charges.240 Their case, as
laid out in their instructions, began by restating two classic presump-
tions of the common law. First, proof of a crime must be "beyond a
reasonable doubt."24 ' This was a standard rule of evidence that could not
be contradicted. Second, the law favored marriage. 242 What this meant,
in the context of Edwin's and Lillian's case, was that in a doubtful case,
the law requires a particular sexual relationship to be deemed common-
law marriage. ("The law never puts a guilty construction upon the acts
of any person, without actual proof. The law presumes innocence always
and reluctantly adopts the theory of guilt.") 243
Kansas, they pointed out, still retained common-law marriage even
after the enactment of the licensing statute. If this was so, then the stat-
ute must be interpreted as directory only because parties remained free
to marry one another even in the absence of state officials or clergy-
men.244 Concluding this line of reasoning, they pointed out that the jury
should be instructed to banish their prejudice against Edwin and Lillian
and reach its verdict solely in "view of all the circumstances proved." 45
237. Id.
238. See Defendants' Instructions of the Court at 27, State v. Walker, 13 P. 279 (Kan.
1887) (No. 4312).
239. Id. at Instruction no. 1.
240. Id at Instructions no. 2-3.
241. Id. at Instruction no. 3.
242. Id. at Instruction no. 8.
243. Id. at Instruction no. 3.
244. Id. at Instruction no. 5.
245. Id. at Instruction no. 4.
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After advancing these claims, Overmyer and Clemens made a turn
towards historical and jurisprudential argument.24 Remarkably for the
day, they invoked the authority of the medieval Catholic Church in
support of the proposition that marriage was a product of nature.247 The
Church taught that marriage predated the law's regulation of it as an
institution and allowed for marriage outside the forms of law.248 Indeed,
the medieval Church taught that the consent of the parties, by itself,
without the intervention of any superior authority, whether Church or
State, was sufficient to contract marriage.249 This practice, known as
clandestine marriage, is the cornerstone of our notion of common-law
marriage.250 Of course, Overmyer and Clemens never mentioned that in
Catholic doctrine such marriages were perpetual and indissoluble.
4. The Verdict
What survives of the trial record suggests that Judge Crozier turned
his famous acid wit against Overmyer and Clemens when they presented
these instructions. He must have been irritated in the extreme by behav-
ior he took to be grandstanding, if not abuse of the judicial process.
"T] he Court, as to each and all of said instructions, severally and as to
the whole thereof, by distinct and different rulings, refused to give said
instructions, or any of them." 251' Following the delivery of each ruling,
Overmyer and Clemens "duly excepted."252 Reading between the lines of
these carefully chosen words, one gets a sense of the tension that both
sides must have felt.
While the record, spare and lean as it is, indicates a tense but
smoothly running process, Moses Harman in his own account indicates
that Judge Crozier became confused at this point, probably because of
the way Overmyer and Clemens inundated him with novel legal argu-
ment. Perhaps he was angry at what he must have seen as an effort to
hijack a criminal trial for polemical ends, but Crozier mishandled the
issue of jury instructions badly when he failed to reconcile common-law
marriage with the existence of the licensing statute. He rejected defense
counsel's theory, but he lacked a coherent alternative of his own, so he
informed the jury that Edwin and Lillian required a license to marry




250. See supra note 70.
251. Defendants' Instructions of the Court, supra note 238, at 33.
252. Id.
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and that they had failed in this obligation. He then added that should
the two of them attempt to marry anyone else, they would be adjudged
guilty of bigamy.25 3 Moses drew the logical conclusion:
By this ruling, E.C. Walker and Lillian Harman stand between
Scylla and Charybdis! They are to be punished because they are
not married, and if they accept that ruling and marry other
parties then they must be punished as bigamists because they
are NOW MARRIED!!254
Having been thus instructed, the jury "very promptly, as in duty
bound, brought forth the verdict of guilty."255 Walker was sentenced to
75-days' confinement, Lillian to 45.256 When asked if they had anything
to say, Walker deferred.257 Lillian, however, would not stay silent. Ring-
ingly, she declared: "[W/] e have committed no crime." 258
Moses must have realized that Edwin and Lillian would very prob-
ably lose at the trial level. Indeed, it is likely that he and defense counsel,
Overmyer and Clemens, had prepared for that eventuality even before
the marriage itself. This conclusion is driven by the intricacy of the ar-
guments Overmyer and Clemens advanced at trial. They had clearly
thought deeply about these arguments. These were not random claims
thrown together in a rapid ad hoc manner a week or two before trial.
The motion for change of venue was too perfectly crafted for that. The
witness testimony was too artful, the jury instructions too laboriously
constructed. Their arguments presented an ultimatum: either force the
courts to recognize Edwin and Lillian as validly married, with all of their
added conditions and qualifications, or expose the system of marriage
law as a hypocritical sham-a system that prized permanence over the
need to escape from abusive relationships, exclusivity over the primacy
of love.
This was nothing less than a test case, shaped and molded through
the collaboration of Clemens, Overmyer, and Moses, with Edwin and
253. Legality vs. Justice, supra note 217.
254. Id. Some in the radical press did not believe that Crozier was confused in his instruc-
tions but blatantly political: By ruling as he did, Lillian and Edwin faced legal
sanctions whatever they did, whether they lived together or moved on to other par-
ties. Thus Judge Crozier made sure that they remained under legal control. See
LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER Nov. 26, 1886 (excerpting from the Anti-Monopolist).
255. Legality vs. Justice, supra note 217.
256. VALLEY FALLs NEW ERA, Oct. 28, 1886.
257. Edwin C. Walker, Liberty vs. Justice: A Drama of Today, Enacted upon the Boards of




MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER &LAW
Lillian playing the part of martyrs. Together, they had crafted a set of
intellectually appealing arguments that relied on traditional legal catego-
ries to make highly original arguments about marriage. They had access
to a newspaper with a broad national and international circulation. If
they prevailed, they would succeed in drawing from the case law and
traditions of the common law a radical notion of autonomy that could
serve as the foundation for arguing that marriage must be a matter of
personal self-definition. Who knows? Such a notion of autonomy might
be capable of even further expansion. Surely, Moses, Edwin, Lillian, and
their two lawyers realized the possibilities inherent in the arguments
they were making. But even if they failed, even if Edwin and Lillian
were convicted, even if the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tions, their arguments would gain publicity and suasion merely by the
attention the case would receive. Surely Moses, Edwin, and Lillian must
have appreciated that this was the logical outcome of the actions they
took on September 19, 1886.
D. The Eyes of the World
1. Winning the Spin
Almost as soon as the verdict was pronounced, both the prosecu-
tion and the defense tried to seize the initiative in controlling the news
media. The old-line conservative Kansas newspapers rejoiced in the
court's finding of guilt. The Valley Falls New Era regretted only one
thing about the trial-the sentences were not sufficiently stiff.25' The
Valley Falls Register surpassed the New Era in its pleasure. What Edwin
and Lillian sought was "marriage . . . such as a herd of animals in a pas-
ture observe." 26 0 The verdict would teach the miscreants the meaning of
marriage in a civilized state. The Topeka Daily Capital waxed sarcastic in
its editorializing on the case:
The Valley Falls couple who have undertaken to set the laws of
marriage and divorce at defiance will probably learn that a lit-
tle, just a little more regard to what their fellow citizens
generally believe to be for the common good in the respects
259. VALLEY FALLS NEW ERA, Oct. 28, 1886 ("The sentence is not so severe perhaps, as we
might have wished, but a single day's imprisonment stigmatizes their conduct as ef-
fectually as a whole year").
260. New Light On the Subject, VALLEY FALLS REGISTER, Oct. 29, 1886.
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would have served their purpose quite as well as the course
they chose.2 61
But if the Harmans and Walker could not control the Kansas me-
dia, they were nevertheless determined to define how the nation should
see the case. Again, Lucifer was an ideal vehicle for this purpose. Moses
made sure to run the most emotional content possible in order to drive
up sympathy and support for his newly-convicted daughter and associ-
ate editor. Edwin Walker's own mother contributed an article in Lucifer.
I imagine I see the self-elected vigilance committee composed
of the wealth and aristocracy of Valley Falls . .. [meet] to de-
vise ways and means to crush two inoffending persons. Hark,
too, from every whiffet of an editor that wields a pen within
the county comes the demand, 'crucify them, crucify them!'
... I would ask, what have these persons done that they
should be so inhumanly persecuted? ... Have they or their
friends ever stolen a horse . . . ? Have they ever plotted mur-
der? Have they been drunk or disorderly? 'Promiscuity,
promiscuity,' I hear them say.262
Especially effective were letters and columns that Edwin and Lillian
took turns publishing in Lucifer. Edwin declared that his "natural right
to associate" was contemptuously flouted. 263 His "common law rights" to
be treated fairly and to marry whom he wished were stolen from him.264
The positive law, he asserted, must be the "logical practicalization" of
the natural order.2 5 The lesser must conform to the greater and so the
result of the trial must be overturned on appeal.266
If Edwin engaged in ornate philosophical and legal argument, Lilli-
an spoke with simple, fiery defiance: "We are not nearly so much like
little puppies, that we should whine and lick the dust at our oppressor's
,,16726
feet.26 Never surrender, never yield, this was Lillian's credo.268 With
articles like these, it was little wonder that a national readership little
261. Marriage and Divorce, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, Oct. 17, 1886.
262. Mrs. Melissa Walker, Imagination, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 22, 1886.




267. Lillian Harman, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 5, 1886.
268. In another letter, she wrote: "[I]f [our enemies] are congratulating themselves because
they think they are breaking our obstinate spirits, they are mistaken. Brute force can
never make us retract." Letter from Lillian Harman to Moses Hull, reprinted in Luci-
FER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886.
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acquainted with the particulars of Kansas justice would feel an
upwelling of sympathy for the two free lovers and simultaneous anger
and outrage at their mistreatment.
Moses made sure to reprint the coverage the case was receiving both
nationally and internationally. Caroline Severance continued her robust
defense of the two lovers.269 So, too, did Sada Bailey Fowler.2 7 0 But now,
in the period after the trial and before the appeal was decided, a rising
chorus of voices could be heard denouncing the unfolding travesty.
Theodore R. Kinget, a New York doctor and author of a prominent
medical treatise, acknowledged that "[t]his will be a test case." 27 1 The
marriage and divorce laws had become "abominable" in Kinget's estima-
tion, and he hoped the appeal would speed the rapid repeal of unjust
and socially dangerous laws.272 Civil liberties, he asserted, meant more
than freedom of speech or press. They necessarily included sexual mat-
ters, where all "invasive laws" had to be overturned.273
Alfred E. Giles,.the New England spiritualist, declared that it was
not Edwin and Lillian-who were the criminals, but those who had tram-
pled upon their natural rights.274 Joseph Anthony, Susan B. Anthony's
cousin, also praised the defendants. "Would it not be well for reformers
to preach less and practice more?" he wrote, an implicit challenge to
those who sat on the sidelines while men and women like Edwin and
Lillian suffered for the cause of sexual freedom.275
269. Severance lamented the harshness of prison life that confronted Edwin and Lillian:
"How great the change from home to hell, and how hard to be deprived of the socie-
ty of those whose love and sympathy are daily needed under the most favorable
conditions of life." C. Severance, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Feb. 11, 1887.
270. Sada Bailey Fowler, "Happy New Year"to Noble Lucifer, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER,
Dec. 17, 1886 (comparing Edwin and Lillian to the abolitionists who went to prison
over their opposition to slavery).
271. T.R. Kinget, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 22, 1886. Kinget came to the
position that restrictive laws on marriage and sexuality had to be repealed during his
work among the poor in the Bowery Section of New York City. See TIMOTHY MES-
SER-KRUSE, THE YANKEE INTERNATIONAL: MARXISM AND THE AMERICAN REFORM
TRADITION, 1848-1876 139 (1998); cf THEODORE R. KINGET, MEDICAL GooD
SENSE (1886) (Kinget's medical treatise).
272. Kinget, supra note 271.
273. T.R. Kinget, Invasive Laws, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 3, 1886.
274. Alfred E. Giles, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 10, 1886. Giles was a
friend of Sojourner Truth. See SOJOURNER TRUTH, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER
TRUTH, BONDSWOMAN OF OLDEN TIME, EMANCIPATED BY THE NEW YORK LEGISLA-
TURE IN THE EARLY PART OF THE PRESENT CENTURY: WITH A HISTORY OF HER
LABORS AND CORRESPONDENCE DRAWN FROM HER "BOOK OF LIFE" 263 (Oliver Gil-
bert & Francis W. Titus eds., 1878). He was also a confidante of Andrew Jackson
Davis. See DAVIS, supra note 59, at 249.
275. Joseph Anthony, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 31, 1886. Joseph Antho-
ny (1829-1887) resided in Coleta, Illinois, where he worked as a farmer. See 4 THE
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Radical newspapers and even more mainstream ones from across
the country helped swell the tide of opposition to the verdict. The popu-
list politician and spiritualist lecturer Moses Hull allowed his newspaper
to be used to raise funds for the couple. 276 Foote's Health Monthly urged
on the combatants: "Battles for freedom have to be fought over and over
again." 277 The Galveston Daily News in Texas called for the immediate
release of the prisoners. 278 Lucien Pinney, the editor of the Winsted Press
in Connecticut, lamented the arrest and complained that there is no
crime in sleeping together, whether married or not.27 Letters from across
the country flowed into Lucifer's editorial offices,280 as did contributions
to the defense fund.281
Indeed, the case had even garnered an international audience. A
Canadian correspondent wished there could be "more noble and reso-
lute men and women like Lillian and Edwin Walker."28 2 The editor of
the English radical newspaper The Present Day expressed his shock at the
state of affairs in America: "We in England have generally an impression
that America is the land of the free; but certainly it would seem that in
some things we enjoy greater liberty than what is granted in some of
your United States." 28 3 The London Anarchist noted the hypocrisy of the
SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY: WHEN
CLOWNS MAKE LAWS FOR QUEENS, 1880-1887 109 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997).
276. See, e.g., Moses Hull, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886 (urging readers to
"take some financial stock in [the] case"). For a sampling of Hull's spiritualist writ-
ings, see MOSES HULL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLICAL SPIRITUALISM (1895); MOSES
HULL, OUR BIBLE: WHO WROTE IT? (1900); MOSES HULL, ALL ABOUT DEVILs (5th
ed. 1901). On Hull the populist politician, see MARK A. LAUSE, THE CIVIL WAR'S
LAST CAMPAIGN: JAMES B. WEAVER, THE GREENBACK-LABOR PARTY & THE POLITICS
OF RACE & SECTION (2001) 159-61.
277. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886 (quoting Foote's Health Monthly). Foote's
Health Monthly was much more than a health magazine. It was one of the leading re-
form periodicals in the area of human sexuality and was in chronic legal difficulty for
its efforts. See WOOD, supra note 196 (examining historical documentation of the
Footes' free-speech activities and contending that the Footes might be the greatest
philanthropists in the history of the free speech movement).
278. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 24, 1886 (quoting the Galveston Daily News).
279. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Oct. 15, 1886 (quoting an editorial by L.V. Pinney in
the Winstead Press).
280. A typical edition of Lucifer published letters received from places as scattered as Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Texas, and Wisconsin, among other locations. See, e.g., LUCIFER THE
LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 12, 1886.
281. A typical edition of Lucifer listed 79 contributions to the defense fund plus an addi-
tional three pledges. See, e.g., The Defense Fund, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov.
12, 1886.
282. J. Kendrick, Letter, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Feb. 4, 1887.
283. Thomas Barrett, Letter from an English Editor, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 26,
1886.
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conviction. If Edwin and Lillian had simply slept together, they would
have escaped punishment, but "because of their honesty of purpose"
they had been made to suffer outrageous criminal sanctions.28
The mood outside of Kansas, if not within its borders, had swung
so far in favor of Edwin and Lillian that the regional papers felt an obli-
gation to admonish these intruders to tread carefully. The Topeka Daily
Capital editorialized:
E.C. Walker and Lillian Harmon [sic], the free lovers, who are
now in confinement in the county jail at Oskaloosa, on a
charge of living together as man and wife without being for-
mally married, are posing before the public as martyrs. The
principals are making such fools of themselves and the case is
so absurd, that one can scarcely believe that they could impress
this opinion upon anyone. But from their paper-the Lucifer,
it would seem that they have the substantial sympathy of
many persons, for the great sacrifice they have made at the al-
ter [sic] of personal liberty.285
The paper went on to warn against contributing to the defense
fund; no doubt, Harman and Walker mean to divert these funds to their
286
own nefarious use.
2. Libertarians vs. Spiritualists
Benjamin Tucker, the editor of Liberty and Edwin Walker's mentor,
was regarded as a man of cold logic and even chillier interpersonal
skills.287 Even a friend once described him as a "glittering icicle of log-
ic."288 He was devoted to purity of doctrine and had no regard for
persons or politics. 289 Edwin might reasonably have expected Tucker's
support. He and Lillian, after all, were challenging the foundations of
American marriage law. If he managed to secure Tucker's blessing, then
the couple could win some extremely influential supporters to their
284. LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec. 31, 1886 (quoting the London Anarchist).
285. Editorial, The Walker-Harmon Case, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, Oct. 22, 1886.
286. Id.
287. PAUL AviucH, ANARCHIST PORTRAITS 145 (1988).
288. Id. at 146.
289. See generally BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY
OF THE MODERN LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT (2007). "Tucker played the role of
movement leader and enforcer, dictating what he called the 'plumb line' of individu-
alist anarchism." Id. at 43.
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cause-for Tucker, too, had both national and international follow-
*290
ings.
Support was not forthcoming. Tucker was grieved and disappoint-
ed. He lamented that Walker's challenge did not go nearly far enough in
demolishing the stifling and restrictive marriage laws. He sadly acknowl-
edged that while he once regarded Walker as intelligent and reliable, he
now had to revise that opinion downward.291 What Tucker wanted was a
full-frontal challenge to the very idea of marriage. Sexual relations,
Tucker asserted, were wholly private; marriage, by injecting a role for the
state and other interested parties, violated this privacy principle and
should therefore be abolished, not reformed.292 Walker, in contrast,
sought to expand the legal category of marriage to include the sort of
relationship he contemplated with Lillian, and this was intolerable.293
Tucker explained to Walker where he thought the problem lay:
Suppose, he argued, the courts rule in your favor and you are declared
lawfully married to Lillian. You might think you have vindicated the
cause of free-love marriage but you would be wrong. You have succeed-
ed, rather, in committing yourself and Lillian to follow the restrictive
divorce laws.294 Once you let the state into the bedroom, you will have
to accept all of the state's rules. A free-love marriage is an impossibility
since there can be no compromising with the authority of the state. The
state will find ways to enforce its norms: "[What you have proposed is]
worse than compromise; it will be absolute, wholesale, unconditional sur-
render."295 Tucker assured Walker, with as much invective as he could
muster, that he was disowning Walker and would urge all like-minded
libertarians to do the same.296
Firm and uncompromising though he was, Tucker also decided to
make room in Liberty for Walker's response. Walker explained that he
290. Tucker was a multi-lingual student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
when he was in his late teens. It was there that he developed his interest in anarchist
writers. He translated works of a number of European anarchists, including Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin. AVRICH, supra note 287, at 144. SeeJAMES J.
MARTIN, MEN AGAINST THE STATE: THE ExposITORS OF INDIVIDUALIST ANARCHISM
IN AMERICA, 1827-1908 206 (2009); MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 389.
291. BENJAMIN TUCKER, Editorial, Not Compromise, but Surrender, LIBERTY, Oct. 30,
1886, at 4.
292. Id.
293. Walker's line of defense was that "[t]he agreement between a man and a woman to
live together as husband and wife is the essential element in marriage, all things else
being unnecessary adjuncts." Id. (quoting a letter from E.C. Walker to Tucker that





MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
shared Tucker's end goal. Marriage, he asserted, was a culturally relative
concept with sexual relations of greater or lesser duration as its only
common denominator.2 97 He believed that the law should be made to
accommodate this minimalist understanding. 298 But this goal could not
be reached by standing on purity of doctrine at the expense of on-the-
ground reality. Legal change, Walker asserted, was a step-by-step process,
and his test case was intended merely as the first blow against a rigid,
brittle system. Once you introduced free love into matrimony, the whole
edifice would crumble soon enough. "[WIhen it becomes recognized
that the mutual consent of a man and woman to live in the social rela-
tion is all that is essential in marriage, the whole marrying machinery of
the State will rapidly fall into disuse.,
299
The difference between Tucker's and Walker's approaches is one we
see repeated constantly over the whole course of American political and
legal history. Tucker is the absolutist who sees any compromise or
acknowledgement that reality might be more complex than simple bina-
ries to be abject and total surrender to an adversary's position. Indeed,
he wrote explicitly in these terms in addressing Walker."oo Walker, on the
other hand, was the gradualist, the one who believed that incremental
change leads, over time, to revolutionary results. Over the long haul of
history, Walker was closer to the truth. The institution of marriage re-
sponded to pressure pretty much in the ways he predicted."' But in the
immediacy of the moment, Tucker had the upper hand. The practical
result of this frosty exchange was to alienate an important source of po-
tential support for Edwin and Lillian's cause.
297. Id. (quoting Walker's letter).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. The Walker-Harmon Case, supra note 285.
301. Thus Jana Singer has made the claim that in the preceding quarter-century "family
law has become increasingly privatized." Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family
Law, 1992 Wisc. L. REv. 1443, 1444 (1992). She points to a number of features of
family law in which publicly-established, statute-based expectations have now given
way to the private arrangements of the parties. She identifies no-fault divorce as "per-
haps the most obvious example of this privatization process." Id., at 1445. But she
identifies other areas as well-adoption, surrogate parenting, and "the rise of media-
tion as a preferred means for resolving divorce and custody disputes." Id. Still other
examples might be added, especially the fact that adultery and fornication statutes,
where they remain on the books, have largely been rendered dead letters. See RICH-
ARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE To AMERICA'S SEx LAWS 3
(1996) ("[C]riminal prohibitions against adultery and fornication ... are almost nev-
er enforced."). Even in Moses Harman's day, the criminal law against adultery and
fornication was only haphazardly and selectively enforced. See LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 448 (3d ed. 2005).
[Vol. 19:71120
THE DEVIL COMES TO KANSAS
If Tucker spurned Moses, Edwin, and Lillian for their perceived
lack of doctrinal purity, Ezra Heywood was not so discriminating. Hey-
wood had been a pioneer in the fight for free speech. 02 He was a
spiritualist who, in 1877, had run afoul of Anthony Comstock, the au-
thor of the Comstock Act and its chief enforcer thanks to his position as
Special United States Postal Inspector.303 The Comstock Act criminally
punished those who used the U.S. Mails to send obscene materials, and
Comstock made use of a very relaxed definition of obscenity-the Hick-
lin standard-to pursue sinners and scoundrels rash enough to think
they could disseminate their subversive ideas through the mails.304 Hey-
wood was arrested for publishing Cupid's Yokes, which argued that
"Cupid"-the love principle-was chained down by two great yokes,
the Church and the Law, and that it needed to be liberated from both.o
There was nothing prurient about the book. It was sharp tongued, di-
rected at a popular audience, made fun of the authorities, but it was not
especially suggestive. For this offense, Comstock secured a conviction
and a jail term for Heywood-although President Rutherford B. Hayes
ultimately pardoned him.306
In the early 1880s, Heywood was facing another prosecution by
Comstock, and this time it was Moses Harman who helped to defeat the
charges. He wrote about Heywood's plight relentlessly, raised money for
302. Zechariah Chafee, Ezra Hervey Heywood, 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
609, 610 (Dumas Malone ed., 1932) (describing Heywood's "astonishing volume of
propaganda" as both "courageous" and "widely read"). Chafee, a Harvard civil liber-
ties lawyer, characterizes Ezra Heywood and his wife Angela as "two fiery spirits." Id.
303. On Comstock, see Reid, supra note 3.
304. The Hicklin standard targeted not only prurient materials, but even advocacy that
made use of sexually questionable words or phrases. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360
(1868). At issue in Hicklin was The Confessional Unmasked, an anti-Catholic pam-
phlet. It reproduced a "loose translation" from Latin of some questions priests were
supposed to ask women penitents regarding sexual sins. The Catholic writers so ex-
cerpted were leading luminaries and sainted doctors of the Church. The unstated
premise was, if this is what is on the minds of the best lights of the Catholic Church,
just think how twisted the whole religion must be. The pamphlet was not porno-
graphic. It did not stimulate or arouse. It operated in the world of ideas and sought to
change minds. The royal judges condemned it for its frank and blunt sexual language
anyway. See WAYNE C. BARTEE & ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, LITIGATING MORALITY:
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND ITS ENGLISH RooTs 65-70 (1992) (discussing
Hicklin's application in the United States).
305. EzRA H. HEYWOOD, CUPID'S YOKES, reprinted in FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE
STATE: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALIST FEMINISM 129-42 (Wendy McElroy ed.,
1982).
306. See generally MARTIN HENRY BLArr, FREE LOVE AND ANARCHISM: THE BIOGRAPHY
OF EzRA HEYWOOD 100-142 (1989) (portraying the episode from an anarchist per-
spective).
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his defense fund, and finally relished in Heywood's triumph.307 Hey-
wood must have appreciated that it was now his turn to assist Moses
Harman and his family in their hour of need. Perhaps he felt a kinship
towards Moses because Moses' second wife was a spiritualist and a suc-
cessful medium when she was younger.o0 Perhaps, too, he was grateful
for the support Moses had given him. Whatever the reason, Heywood
was vigorous and unsparing in his defense. He devoted the October
1886 issue of the magazine he edited, The Word, to the Walker/Harman
case.
The issue's front page carried short messages from both Edwin and
Lillian. Adopting spiritualist imagery to gain the affection of readers,
Edwin wrote, "The Essential Verities, the Free Spontaneities, are the
binding forces in all social life. These weld in a loyal brother and sister-
hood. They grow stronger as the shadows lengthen and the Occident
flames with hues of life's evening.""o' Lillian, once again, was simple,
frank, and to the point: "We love each other. Nothing save prison bars
or death can separate us. But the cause-our principles-shall have our
allegiance before everything else on earth; even our love must be subor-
dinate to our principles.""'
A series of articles defended the stance they took. An essay entitled
"The Kansas Outrage" denounced Lillian's imprisonment for simply
wishing to defend her autonomy within the marital relationship.311 Mar-
riage was innately oppressive towards women, and state authorities
sought to reinforce this oppressiveness by crushing her spirit: "This
young woman is only 16 years of age and she is in jail! . .. She knows
that when she stands up in marriage she surrenders her body. She is un-
willing to do it. She insists that she shall have control of it to the end of
her life."3 12 Lillian, the unnamed author insisted, "has a right to her own
body."3 13
Jay Chaapel (1829-1902), a spiritualist and one-time editor of the
town newspaper at Liberal, Missouri" -the famous town without
307. See, e.g., Moses Harman, Editorial, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Sep. 14, 1883
(sympathizing with Heywood); see also Moses Harman, Mr. Gault and Christian
Morals, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Nov. 16, 1883 (attacking Comstock for his
prosecution of Heywood).
308. Letter from Harman to Denton, supra note 64.
309. Edwin C. Walker, Contract, THE WoRD, Oct. 1886.
310. Lillian Harman, The Issue, THE WORD, Oct. 1886.
311. The Kansas Outrage, THE WoRD, Oct. 1886.
312. Id.
313. Id. (emphasis in original).
314. Benjamin Tucker, Fighting For Free Speech in Liberal, LIBERTY, Jul. 17, 1886.
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Christians"'--defended Edwin and Lillian's choice to lead married lives
without permission of the state. If marriage was a contract, Chaapel in-
sisted, it had to be treated like a contract in which parties are left alone
to define the terms:
If there is a right on earth more sacred than another, it is
where two persons of opposite sex, who love each other,
choose their own way in regulating their private affairs. Mar-
riage has been declared a civil contract with which outside
parties have no right to meddle; it is only a relic of barbarism
and religious superstition for the church and her psycholo-
gized sympathizers to interfere therewith any more than in any
316other contract.
The spiritualists, clearly, were not as dogmatic as that libertarian
defender of orthodoxy, Benjamin Tucker. This was probably for at least
two reasons. First, spiritualists were, from the beginning, a more eclectic
lot who nevertheless shared a common suspicion of religious orthodoxy,
especially as expressed through the power of the state. Second, unlike
the libertarian Tucker, who possessed enough social and political clout
to avoid prosecution by Comstock or anyone else, 1 spiritualists lacked
power and knew what it was like to be persecuted for their beliefs.318
315. Founded by the Republican lawyer George Walser in 1880, Liberal Missouri was
intended to be a municipality free from Christian influence. In the 1880s, between
500 and 800 people resided there. Walser established a short-lived "Freethought
University" where he taught courses in law. He also established an orphanage
where abandoned or unwanted children might be raised free from Christianity.
Walser wrote of his town: "We have here neither priest, preacher, justice of the
peace, drunkard, loafer, begger, or person in want, nor have we a disreputable
character. This cannot truthfully be said of any Christian town on earth." Dic-
TIONARY OF MISSOURI BIOGRAPHY 783 (Lawrence 0. Christensen ed., 1999).
316. Jay Chaapel, Social Freedom, THE WORD, Oct. 1886.
317. When Anthony Comstock decided that two poems included in Walt Whitman's
Leaves of Grass were obscene, he thought first to prosecute Whitman, but was de-
terred by his massive popularity. He then thought to prosecute Benjamin Tucker,
who had published the offending poems, but was again deterred, this time by the
connections Tucker had cultivated in wealthy New England circles. He finally de-
termined to prosecute the hapless Ezra Heywood, who had few friends in high places
and thus made an easy target. See Reid, supra note 3.
318. There were efforts in the 1880s and 1890s to outlaw particular practices of spiritual-
ists, such as Pennsylvania's attempt to declare illegal mediums who purported to
predict the future. WILLIAM CLEVELAND, THE RELIGION OF MODERN SInuRTUAUSM
AND ITS PHENOMENA 178 (1896). The wills of testators who consulted mediums were
often contested on the basis of insanity, undue influence, or fraud. See, e.g., Thomp-
son v. Hawks, 14 F. 962 (Ind. 1883); In re Estate of Spencer, 96 Cal. 448,453
(1892); Connor v. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556 (1887); In re Dunham, 27 Conn. 192
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Spiritualists and libertarians were not in the mainstream of nine-
teenth-century American life, but they were not negligible in their
influence. They were audiences that, when properly appealed to, might
write letters to local newspapers, voice their concerns to politicians, and
perhaps even agitate a bit more generally. In appealing to these audienc-
es, Edwin and Lillian hoped-perhaps in vain, perhaps not-to shift the
climate of public opinion.
E Briefing the Appeal
1. The Clemens/Overmyer Briefs
Although Lillian's term of confinement expired in mid-November,
1886, and Edwin's in mid-December, they both refused to pay court
costs-which were a part of the sentence-and so remained confined in
the Oskaloosa jail.' Oral argument on .the appeal was set for January,
1887. It is probable, therefore, that Clemens and Overmyer wrote their
briefs in November and December of 1886, just as Lillian and Edwin
were resolving to remain incarcerated for as long as necessary.
The option was open to them to make a case for Edwin and Lillian
on civil disobedience grounds. Henry David Thoreau320 and the aboli-
tionists had already helped to embed in the American consciousness the
significance of civil disobedience to laws that frustrated social pro-
gress.32' This was the course counseled by Benjamin Tucker.3 22 Overmyer
and Clemens, however, insisted that embedded within the common-law
tradition were the seeds of a strong commitment to personal freedom
that could protect sexual privacy. They were determined to prove this in
their briefs.
They began by striking at what they understood to be the core of
American marriage law-its roots in the Christian religion. Reversing
their previous endorsement of medieval Catholicism, they now argued
(1857); McClary v. Stull, 62 N.W. 561 (Neb. 1895); Greenwood v. Cline, 7 Or. 17
(1879).
319. Edwin C. Walker & Lillian Harman, JailJottings, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Dec.
10, 1886.
320. See generally HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 1
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1849).
321. See, e.g., Lewis Perry, Black Abolitionists and the Origins of Civil Disobedience, in
MORAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN LIFE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL HISTORY
103-21 (Karen Halttunen & Lewis Perry eds., 1998).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 297-300.
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that the Catholic Church stood behind this unwelcome relationship be-
tween religion and law and that its undue influence had to be laid bare:
There is nothing in the nature of a marriage contract that is
more sacred than that of other contract[s], that requires the in-
terposition of a person in holy orders, or that it should be
solemnized in a church. Every idea of this kind, entertained by
any person, has arisen wholly from the usurpation of the
church of Rome upon the rights of the civilian.323
The statute under which Edwin and Lillian were being prosecuted
was an expression of this odious history. It was worth bearing in mind,
Overmyer and Clemens reminded the Court, that the statute was itself
new. Until 1867, there was no requirement in Kansas to obtain a mar-
riage license and, in fact, most Kansans who married before that date
were married in common-law ceremonies closely resembling Lillian and
Edwins.324 And so, Overmyer and Clemens must have concluded with
satisfaction, they had left the Court on the horns of a dilemma: Either
conclude in favor of the licensing requirement, which had the effect
both of calling into question marriages before 1867 and which would
amount to a concession to a foreign, Romanist import, or side with the
freedom Kansans originally enjoyed. Freedom of contract, they argued,
must be allowed to prevail.32
To this point, however, Clemens and Overmyer begged a central
question: What was marriage? And did Lillian and Edwin conform their
consent and subsequent behavior to the prevailing definition? Certainly,
their actions and expectations differed in important respects from those
pioneering Kansans who married before 1867. Surely most of these early
settlers arrived in Kansas with the conventional Christian expectation
that marriage should be permanent, exclusive, and procreative. Clemens
and Overmyer lightly passed over this crucial point in stating their case
for freedom. "Marriage," the two lawyers wrote, "does not consist in
323. Brief for Appellants at 2, State v. Walker, 13 P. 279 (Kan. 1887)(No. 4312) (quoting
TAPPING REEVE & Lucius E. CHIrrENDEN, LAW OF BARON AND FEMME OF PARENT
AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF
COURTS OF CHANCERY, WITH AN ESSAY OF THE TERMs HEIR, HEIRS, AND HEIRS OF
THE BODY (1816)).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 4. ("As it can scarcely be supposed that the Legislature intended to punish mar-
ried people for living together as man and wife, and as the provision quoted does not
punish people for marrying otherwise than 'according to Hoyle,' but only for 'living
together' without being married at all, we think this one proposition involves all there
is of the case, so far as the law is concerned ..... ).
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words, nor in ceremonies, but in the intention of the parties; and in eve-
ry case where the question arises whether a given transaction amounted
to a marriage, the point to be established is whether the parties intended
by that transaction to become husband and wife."3 26 They cited many
cases to support the proposition that consent, even without the authori-
ty of the state, made marriage.3 27 Still, they had an important hurdle to
overcome, namely, how to account for the fact that Edwin and Lillian
reserved to themselves questions about permanence and child-rearing.
Were not these among the elements parties had to intend when they
intended to make a marriage?
Permanence, Clemens and Overmyer asserted, should no longer
count as an essential feature of marriage law. Where a state did not allow
for divorce, perhaps it should be otherwise, but here in Kansas, divorce
was allowed: "Our laws provide for ten different cases of 'unfortunate
fate' which will dissolve the marriage relation; and hence, 'until death do
us part,' is not a necessary term of marriage. 3 28 You cannot punish Ed-
win and Lillian for merely acknowledging the prevailing state of the
12329
law.
But what of the effort to determine in advance the question of
child custody and support? For this, the defense team turned to a noto-
rious case from England-the separation of Annie Besant (1847-1933)
from her Anglican clergyman husband Frank.3 ' Annie had already
gained fame in 1879 for her efforts to publish birth control manuals and
her insistent secularism.3 She would go on to enjoy one of the most
breathtakingly varied careers of any modern figure.332 What interested
326. Id at 5 (emphasis in original).
327. There is rich irony in the cases Clemens and Overmyer cite. Many of them are com-
mon-law cases that still make use of phraseology originally developed by medieval
canon lawyers to make the same point. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Kimmel, 31 Mich. 127,
132 (1874) (speaking of consent in the present tense-verba depresenti).
328. Brief for Appellants, supra note 323, at 7.
329. Id. at 6.
330. Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. Div. 605 (1879).
331. See generally EDWARD ROYLE, RADICALS, SECUIARISTS, AND REPUBLICANS: POPULAR
FREETHOUGHT IN BRITAIN, 1866-1915 (1980).
332. Annie Besant would become a prolific writer on religious themes, adopting a stance
that might be called today "new age." She experimented with theosophy, and later,
with a variety of Indian spiritual practices. She finally moved to India, where she
translated the Bhagavad Gita into English and advocated for the widespread adoption
of yoga. She also became involved in the Indian home-rule movement, where she
made the acquaintance of such figures as Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and
M.A. Jinnah. On her long and eventful life, see generally ARTHUR H. NETHERCOT,
THE FIRST FIvE LIVES OF ANNIE BESANT (1960) (on Besant's life until her move to
India in 1894); ARTHUR H. NETHERCOT, THE LAST FOUR LivEs OF ANNIE BESANT
(1963) (documenting her time in India).
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Overmyer and Clemens were Annie's marital problems and their legal
resolution. Having lost interest in her marriage, Annie induced her hus-
band to enter a voluntary separation agreement that included
stipulations regarding custody and visitation rights with respect to their
two children."' When Annie complained that Frank had violated the
agreement on visitation and sought a court-ordered reconciliation so
that she might live with Frank and tend to the children's needs directly,
the Chancery Court denied the petition." Defense counsel summarized
the holding: "An agreement for separation without a divorce is not only
legal, but may be specifically enforced if either party elects to return."33
That the Besant case also involved a voluntary agreement on child cus-
tody and visitation rights provided even greater strength to the
appellants' defense, in light of Edwin and Lillian's declaration that they
would settle any child custody disputes they might have privately, with-
out recourse to the courts.
For good measure, the two brief-writers turned to the question of
mandatory and directory statutes. Marriage, they asserted, "is an institu-
tion of nature-not of law; and as it existed before statutes, it can be
entered into without their assistance."33 6 Common-law marriage devel-
oped as a legal doctrine in acknowledgement of this basic natural fact."'
Statutes that abrogate this right were to be narrowly construed: "[W]hen
we come to test the legality of a common-law marriage, in view of a
statute, we do not ask whether the statute makes it valid, but whether it
makes it void.""' The United States Supreme Court itself declared that a
statute might only outlaw common-law marriage where there were "ex-
press words of nullity."" The position of the two attorneys was that the
Kansas statute never included express words nullifying common-law
marriage. Therefore, Moses' interpretation of the statute, back when he
presided at the marriage ceremony and when he later testified under
oath about it,340 was a correct understanding of the law. There was never
any obligation on the part of private parties to seek a marriage license.
The logic of the case now became clear: The statute was an imposi-
tion of religion that should be resisted; the parties validly married; they
were entitled to take the positions they took on permanence, custody,
and support; and the statute was a directory one, addressed only to state
333. Besant, 12 Ch. Div. at 624-629.
334. Besant, 12 Ch. Div. at 630.
335. Brief for Appellants, supra note 323, at 7.
336. Id. at 8.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877).
340. Supra note 225-226 and accompanying text.
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officials, not to private parties. Their brief, in other words, reads today
like a virtuosic effort to achieve, through reliance on the common law,
an outcome that would have been deemed radical in most legal circles."'
2. The Gilluly/Bradford Brief for Appellee
The State of Kansas submitted a brief bearing two names, William
Gilluly, the Attorney for Jefferson County,342 and Simeon Briggs Brad-
ford (1847-1902), the State Attorney General. A Republican, Bradford
was a staunch exponent of the state's prohibition amendment. He de-
fended it in print, in a book entitled Prohibition in Kansas,343 a work that
both celebrated his own daring exploits344 and that laid out a legislative
roadmap for prohibition campaigners in other states to follow."
Progress and civilization-these were themes that characterized
much of the temper of the times, and these ideals suffused the brief that
Gilluly and Bradford produced. Marriage, they asserted, "possess[es] the
highest title to respect and veneration."4' For this reason, the state has
assumed the responsibility of establishing "regulations for the due cele-
bration of marriage." 47 The moral sense of the community having been
341. David Overmyer submitted a Supplemental Brief, which was signed by himself alone.
This brief was meant as a defense of Edwin and Lillian's "individual liberty ... and
rights of conscience." Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 2, State v. Walker, 13 P.
279 (Kan. 1887)(No. 4312). "[T]he right to marry," he asserted, "springs from the law
of nature," and so cannot be removed by state authorities. Id. at 7. Parties, he contin-
ued, have the fundamental right to waive their rights, and this is as true of marriage
as it is of any other contract. Id. at 17. In fact, Lillian and Edwin have been improp-
erly singled out because of the form of their marriage: "Would an agreement not to
exact marital rights against the inclination of the woman invalidate a marriage au-
thorized by a license and solemnized by a clergyman? Of course not." Id. The
promise of mutual "love" is all that is needed to make a marriage. Id. at 18. Indeed,
the parties set no temporal limit to their union, they did not renounce the possibility
of children, they did not affirmatively agree to allow third parties to disrupt their
marital purity. "Chastity, temperance, abstinence, moderation, and decency mark all
their sayings and doings." Id. at 23. The state constitution is broader than the federal
constitution, Overmyer argued, and protects even the consciences of unbelievers. Id.
at 1-2.
342. See supra Part II.B.3.
343. See generally SIMEON BRIGGS BRADFORD, PROHIBITION IN KANSAS AND THE KANSAS
PROHIBITION LAW (1889).
344. Id at 9-10 (recounting how Bradford personally traveled to that wild cattle town,
Dodge City, to clean up its saloon culture).
345. See, e.g., WALTER W. SPOONER, Prohibition, Benefits of in THE CYCLOPAEDIA OF
TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION: A REFERENCE BOOK OF FACTS 499, 506-13 (1891).
346. Brief for Appellee at 2, State v. Walker, 13 P. 279 (Kan. 1887) (No. 4312).
347. Id.
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violated, the state law ignored, marriage, the great building block of civi-
lization, mocked-Edwin and Lillian were justly convicted for these
reasons alone."'
Gilluly and Bradford were especially emphatic on the necessity to
obey the law. This was an age of unruliness and a time when anarchists
and terrorists threatened the sanctity of civilized life. An anarchist reign
of terror gripped Europe-the Russian czar was assassinated,34' and oth-
er "[p]olice officials, politicians, [and] royal leaders" were targeted."o
The early spring of 1886 was filled with foreboding that this deadly so-
cial disease was about to lap onto American shores.35' Then, the
Haymarket Square riot happened, in Chicago, in May of 1886.352 A pipe
bomb was thrown into a line of police officers during a labor rally, kill-
ing a policeman."' Police and workers then exchanged gunfire, killing at
least another eleven or twelve victims. 3 54
Appellee's counsel were desperate in their brief to hang Haymarket
Square around the necks of Edwin and Lillian. "[TIhis is an outbreak of
the same disease (only in a milder form, perhaps) as appeared at Chicago
last spring"-this was their description of Edwin's and Lillian's decision
to marry outside the forms of law.155 The disease referenced could only
have been the Haymarket Square riot which had occurred the previous
May. Edwin and Lillian's whole purpose in attempting their sham of a
marriage, Gilluly and Bradford contended, was to disturb the peace and
348. "The appellants are now in jail because they willfully violated the law; because they
persisted in setting up what they claimed to be their belief, in opposition to the law,
and undertook to carry it into effect by marrying themselves in defiance of the law.
That is why they are in jail." Id. at 3.
349. JOSEPH R. CONLIN, 2 THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY SINCE
1865 452 (9th ed. 2010).
350. JONATHAN R. WHITE, TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 170 (2011).
351. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SCHAAK, ANARCHY AND ANARCHISTs 87-103 (1889) Written by
the "captain of Police" of Chicago, these pages illustrate the violence of the rhetoric
and the depth of the fear that gripped parts of America in the mid-1880s. Id.
352. The classic account of this incident is PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY
(1984). Cf Daniel E. Karalus, Anarchism, in REVOLTS, PROTESTS, DEMONSTRATIONS,
AND REBELLIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 585, 585-86 (Steven
Laurence Danver ed., 2011) (a good recent summary of the events).
353. Jennifer A. Jovin, Haymarket Square Incident, in DISASTERS, ACCIDENTS, AND CRISES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE NATION'S MOST CATA-
STROPHIC EVENTS, 153, 153-155 (Ballard C. Campbell ed., 2008).
354. The police death toll is generally set at eight, with one officer killed in the bombing
and seven in the shooting that followed. See MICHAEL BURGAN, HAYMARKET SQUARE
TRAGEDY 44 (2006). The number of workers killed is less precisely known. See, e.g.,
GEARARD CHALIAND & ARNAUD BLIN, THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUI-
TY To AL-QAEDA 403 (2007) (estimating five workers killed).
355. Brief for Appellee, supra note 346, at 3.
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destroy marriage as an institution. Kansas should not tolerate such cal-
culated, well-planned defiance:
[The appellants] acted deliberately, and the record warrants
the conclusion that, to marry in spite of the law, to improve
this opportunity to defy the law, to marry themselves and
thereby antagonize the law and vindicate their professed belief
in these matters, rather than to merely marry, was their inten-
tion. They were owners and publishers of a newspaper
published at Valley Falls which advocated such doctrines, and
they eagerly sought and improved this opportunity to show
their deluded followers that they dared, even in face of law, to
practice what they had been preaching."'
The appellee's brief contained remarkably little legal argumentation.
After slicing through the intense emotionalism and the crude fear-
mongering, their argument amounted to this: Marriage in Kansas can
only be civil or religious; if civil, it must be performed by a government
magistrate; if religious, it must be performed by a minister of the
Gospel.' In each instance, "[the] parties seeking to enter that relation ...
must produce a license legally issued. . . . The essential thing seems to
be, the declaration of the consent by both parties, before a person
authorized by law to receive such a declaration.""'
In its simplicity, the appellee's brief swept well beyond prevailing
Kansas law. While failing to acknowledge it, the brief practically called
for the abolition of common-law marriage.' Gilluly and Bradford swept
even beyond the United States Supreme Court, which upheld common-
law marriage where the parties publicly acknowledged their marriage
and where the state did not expressly outlaw common-law marriage by
explicit statutory language. 6 o What Gilluly and Bradford wanted was to
have the Kansas Supreme Court declare the state to have plenary power
to establish the terms and conditions by which marriages came into ex-
istence or were dissolved.36 In a sense, appellee's brief was the mirror
image of appellants'. Both adopted a radical view of the relationship of
marriage and law-Overmyer and Clemens wished to have the Court
356. Id. at 7.
357. Id. at 1-2.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 4. As support, Gilluly and Bradford cited three English cases that upheld Lord
Hardwicke's Act, which abolished common-law marriage in England in 1753. Id. at
4-5.
360. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877).
361. Brief for Appellees, supra note 346, at 5-6.
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recognize a broad right of private autonomy in sexual relations, while
Gilluly and Bradford wanted to place marriage and sexuality entirely
under the control of the state.362
E The Kansas Supreme Court
The Supreme Court that heard Edwin and Lillian's appeal consisted
of three justices, all of whom were Republican in their politics and
Christian in their religious beliefs.
1. The Chief: Albert Howell Horton
A native of New York whose ancestors were among the first English
settlers of New England, Albert Howell Horton (1837-1902) only relo-
cated to Kansas in his mid-rwenties.363 He had been admitted to practice
in Brooklyn, New York in 1860, but the tug of the frontier was irresisti-
ble. Later that year, he found himself in Atchison, Kansas, immersed in
abolitionist politics,3 6 practicing law, and helping to edit a pro-Lincoln
newspaper, the Atchison Champion.365 His position on the paper gave
him the chance to travel, and he made it a point to befriend Lincoln's
Secretary of State William Seward and to write frequently and flattering-
ly of the Union General Ulysses Grant.366
362. Counsel for appellees never used the term "police power," but they nevertheless had
in the back of their minds the sort of capacious state power over marriage described
in State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 403 (1871) ("The right, in the states, to regulate and
control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing
institution [of marriage] is of inestimable importance, and cannot be surren-
dered[.J").
363. 3 WILLIAM E. CONNELLEY, A STANDARD HISTORY OF KANSAS AND KANSANS 1252
(1918).
364. He was known for his fiery, pro-Union speeches. See, e.g., Great Union Meeting! The
True Patriots in Council!, FREEDOM'S CHAMPION, May 4, 1861 (describing Horton's
"able, patriotic, and strong speech").
365. CONNELLEY, supra note 363.
366. In addition to his public responsibilities, Horton assumed the role of an occasional
correspondent to the Champion. Using the initial "H," he would document his trav-
els and observations for the benefit of the Champion's readership. He wrote in
especially glowing terms of the signal accomplishments of Union General Ulysses S.
Grant. Thus, returning from a trip to Washington, D.C. by way of New York, he
was met with news of Grant's victorious Peninsula Campaign. "[N]o power on
earth," Horton wrote, could stop a Grant candidacy for the presidency if he succeed-
ed in finally destroying Robert E. Lee's army. Albert Howell Horton, Editorial
Correspondence, FREEDOM'S CHAMPION, May 26, 1864. Had it not been for Grant's
"firmness and stubborn valor," Lee would have had the tables turned and been besieging
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The acquaintances Horton made during the War served him well as
he climbed the ladder of political success in the later 1860s and 1870s.
Ulysses Grant (now President) named him United States Attorney for
Kansas in 1869, and in 1872 he stood for election to the United States
Senate (a contest which he lost).3 67 Despite this setback, his political
connections served him well when he was appointed to the Chief Jus-
ticeship of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1876 and won election to that
post in his own right a year later.168
Few men of the day were more civic-minded than Horton. He was
president of the Kansas Judicial Association3 69 and the Kansas State Bar
Association.370 He was a director of the Kansas State Historical Society.
He was a member of the Board of Governors of Emporia Presbyterian
College and served a term as Board President.37 2 He was a contributing
editor to the Central Law journal of St. Louis, Missouri, one of the na-
373tion's first law reviews.
But where his civic-miindedness was most apparent was in his in-
volvement in the Kansas Episcopal Church. He was certainly among the
two or three most important, most active Episcopal laymen in the state.
He had a warm relationship with Thomas Hubbard Vail, the Episcopal
Bishop of Kansas. When Vail, faced with personal tragedy, decided that
the time had come to build a leading hospital in Kansas, he turned to
Horton.7' Horton served on the Hospital Board,37 ' helped raise funds
Washington, D.C. Id. Horton turned rhapsodic: "The victorious troops of Grant
haste on and on. Nerved with frequent victories, inspirited with success, our gallant
soldiers cannot fail. The night of doubt is passed. The morning of victory is heralded
in the East. The Republic will not die." Id.
367. See Reid, supra note 3.
368. Id.
369. DANIEL WEBSTER WILDER, ANNALS OF KANSAS: NEW EDITION 942-43 (1886).
370. Id. at 1015.
371. Id at 945; id. at 1163 (discussing Horton's involvement in planning an Historical
Society program honoring, inter alia, "The Pioneers of Kansas").
372. Id at 1021.
373. His name appears on the Central Law journals masthead beginning with the first
1877 issue. 5 CENT. L.J. i (1877).
374. See STORMONT-VAIL REG'L. MED. CTR., 100 YEARS: STORMONT-VAIL REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER 12 (Alice Cnossen ed., 1985). In a brief period of time, Vail's son
died and his wife became blind from disorders Vail considered curable with more ad-
vanced medical treatment. Id He thus resolved to build a state-of-the-art hospital for
Kansas, under the auspices of the Episcopal Church. Id.
375. Horton was among those Bishop Vail summoned to the first planning meeting for
the new hospital. See Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Apr.
18, 1882); cf BLANCHE MERCER TAYLOR, PLENTEOUS HARVEST: THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN KANSAS, 1837-1972 183 (1973) (describing the circumstances of this
meeting).
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for its operation,7  and took an active role first in its construction and
then in its management. 7' Nor was this all. The Episcopal Church of
Kansas held annual conventions, and Horton could invariably be found
assuming a variety of leadership positions. 7 ' At the same time, Horton
retained a close connection with his home parish, Trinity Episcopal
Church in Atchison, Kansas, where he served as a vestryman beginning
in 1882." A five-page letter written by John Henry Hopkins, the Trini-
ty Church's Rector, found in the Horton papers, bespeaks a warm
relationship between the two men."
Conservative to his innermost being, Horton was a strong, staunch
believer in the rule of law and insisted that civil disobedience had no
place in a democratic society. Writing about the Kansas prohibition
amendment, Horton conceded that all persons have a certain "natural
liberty," but that we surrender this liberty upon entry into a civilized
polity "in consideration of receiving the advantages and protections of
government."3 82 This trade-off, by itself, might be sufficient to reject civ-
il disobedience, but in America there is a second reason also to oppose
376. See, e.g, Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Jan. 6, 1887)
(Horton among the Board members who petitioned the State Legislature for financial
assistance for the new facility).
377. See, e.g., Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Apr. 19, 1883)
(establishing building committee).
378. See, e.g., Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Jun. 5, 1884)
(hiring of physicians); Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Jun.
5, 1884) (setting rules to ensure that "charity patients" would not be turned away);
Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (May 5 1884) (hiring of
physicians); Minutes of the Bd. of Trs., Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Apr. 22,
1884) (hiring an Episcopal chaplain for the hospital); Minutes of the Bd. of Trs.,
Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Apr. 18, 1884) (determining the hospital's motto
should be "Christus Consolator"-Christ the Consoler); Minutes of the Bd. of Trs.,
Christ's Hosp., Topeka, Kan. (Jul. 7, 1882) (granting homeopathic physicians the
right to practice at the new hospital).
379. Horton participated on the visitation committee of St. John's School, a military acad-
emy in Salina, Kansas, established by the Diocese. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF KANSAS 14-15 (1891) (attesting that Horton "at-
tend[ed student] recitations," "investigated the various departments," and concluded
that the young men were having their physical, intellectual, and spiritual needs met).
He continued service on the visitation committee through 1895. In 1893, 1896, and
1899, he also served as a Trustee of the Kansas Theological School. See JOURNAL OF
THE PROCEEDINGS for each of these years.
380. FRANCIS S. WHITE, THE STORY OF A KANSAS PARISH 32 (1911).
381. Letter from John Henry Hopkins to Albert Howell Horton (Jan. 8, 1895), in Albert
Howell Horton Papers (on file with the Kansas Historical Society).
382. Albert H. Howell, Loyalty to Law: Address of Hon. Albert H. Horton, Chiefjustice of
Kansas, at Effngham, Atchison County, Sept. 18, 1881, in THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE
LIQUOR TRAFFIC 232, 233 (1883).
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it: We live in a "republic," where "the right of making all the laws resides
in the people[.]"3 3 In a system like ours, "disobedience to [the govern-
ment's] orders or mandates can never be justifiable[.]",8 4 If we don't like
the law, we should work for its repeal, not actively violate it.3 85 Horton
gave two examples of contemporary disobedience he found odious: the
Mormons who flouted federal law in their effort to practice polygamy,386
and the White southerners who were even then trying to subvert the
reconstruction of the South.' But even apart from these examples, all
civil disobedience was wrong: "In brief, obedience to the law is the duty
of the citizen.0 88
2. The Dry Calvinist: William Agnew Johnston
In planning their appellate strategy,. Overmyer and Clemens surely
realized how difficult it would have been to persuade Albert Howell
Horton to rule in their clients' favor. But what of the newest associate,
William Agnew Johnston (1848-1937)?
Johnston would spend over fifty years on the Kansas Supreme
Court (from 1884 to 1935),' author over 3,000 opinions, and partici-
pate in around 21,000 cases. His career was almost unimaginably
large-both in time of service and contributions to public life. But in
December 1886, Johnston was completing his second full year on the
bench and was the Court's youngster, not yet forty years old.
He was defined by a strong mix of religious conservatism and polit-
ical engagement. In his private life, he was an intense Calvinist, deeply
mindful of human fallibility and sin. "The whole of human life," he
once wrote, "is made up of evil and good. The first impulse is always to
do the right, but wrong frequently gains dominion over us."' In this
fallen world, Johnston insisted, we must come to know Christ, since it is
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 234 ("There are ample opportunities to correct, change, and repeal all existing
laws without violence or force.").
386. Id. at 243.
387. Id. at 242-43.
388. Id. at 234.
389. Upon completion of his fiftieth year on the bench, Johnston set a record "which
Kansans promptly claimed as unique among U.S. judges." People, TIME, Dec. 10,
1934.
390. SUPREME COURT OF KAN., IN MEMORY OF WILLIAM AGNEW JOHNSTON 17 (1937).
391. William Agnew Johnston, untitled address catalogued under Miscellaneous Things,
in William Agnew Johnston Papers (undated) (on file with the Kansas Historical So-
ciety).
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only in Christ that we gain the sense of permanence that allows us to
realize how empty and vain are all human achievements.392
In his public and political life, he endorsed the Young Men's Chris-
tian Association;which in the latter nineteenth century was the mighty
right arm of muscular Christianity,9 and spoke before their assemblies.
The Y.M.C.A. stood for the old time-tested truths, the sturdy morality
of our ancestors.9  It had a "great Christian and civilizing" ambition,
Johnston declared,395 and that was to implement God's own plan for the
world by giving force and meaning to "the theory that all the inhabit-
ants of our planet belong to one great family, created, maintained, and
protected by one Almighty God, in whose likeness all are made. 396
It is easy to brand Johnston as something of a zealot, but the reality
was more complex. He was not inflexible on the subject of marriage.
While he was opposed to divorce and recognized marriage as a "Divine-
ly-commanded union," he also appreciated that in this earthly realm
ample accommodation had to be made for divorce.'9 He argued for a
flexible interpretation of the common law, asserting that where marriage
was concerned it was good to break from the "stereotyped common law
forms and methods" in favor of a more flexible jurisprudence.3 98
A year before Edwin and Lillian's marriage, Johnston revealed just
how flexible he could be in an action for divorce. Walton v. Walton in-
volved a woman seeking divorce on the basis of her husband's habitual
drunkenness.39' The husband countered by saying that he was usually
sober and that therefore the divorce petition should be rejected. John-
ston wrote that the term "habitual drunkard" need not mean that the
392. Id.
393. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE FREEMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY
IN AMERICA 159 (1988).
394. PAUL S. BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 108-
20 (1978).
395. William Agnew Johnston, Y.M.C.A. Welcome, in William Agnew Johnston Papers
(undated) (on file with the Kansas Historical Society).
396. Id.
397. William Agnew Johnston, The Divorce Problem, in William Agnew Johnston Papers
(undated) (on file with the Kansas Historical Society). This speech is undated, but in-
ternal evidence, such as Johnston's reference to the "patriots" who are fighting in the
"Cuban War," point to a date sometime around 1898 or 1899. To be sure, while
Johnston thought that divorce should be widely available, he did not think it should
be resorted to for light or trivial reasons: "I recognize that loose notions of the mar-
riage relation bring degradation and the fact that where divorces have been made
common and easy, the obligations of the marriage bond are likely to be disregarded
and the stability of the home and the integrity of the family seriously impaired." Id.
398. William Agnew Johnston, Woman's Kansas Day Club, in William Agnew Johnston
Papers (on file with the Kansas Historical Society).
399. Walton, 8 P. 10 (Kan. 1885).
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person should be drunk "constantly."4 00 He may in fact experience pro-
longed periods of sobriety. What mattered was the severity of the excess
drinking when he did drink.
This was the sort of creativity Overmyer and Clemens were hoping
for. You could forgive them for believing that perhaps Johnston, despite
his roots in evangelical political fervor, might be reachable with the right
arguments.
3. The Seeker of Truth: Daniel M. Valentine
If Overmyer and Clemens could safely write off Horton, and might
at least have harbored some hope for Johnston's support, they must have
thought that Daniel Mulford Valentine (1830-1907), at that time the
longest-serving member of the high court, would be the most easily per-
suaded to support their case.
Valentine and his young wife-whom he married in 1855-moved
to Kansas in 185940' and settled in Ottawa, an explicitly Christian and
402
Baptist community. At least in his youth, however, Valentine was
hardly an orthodox Christian believer. Indeed, he more than dabbled in
spiritualism in his twenties, even writing an essay in 1852 entitled "Spir-
itual Rapping."40 He proposed that biblical Christianity and
spiritualism could be reconciled. Both faiths believed in an immortal
soul. Valentine was confident that after reading the Bible carefully, we
would see that many spirits, good and bad, were constantly loose upon
the land.404 And if we were merely attentive to our surroundings, we
could detect spirits active all around.40 By going to any reputable medi-
400. Walton, 8 P. at 12.
401. Golden Weddings: Mr. and Mrs. D.M Valentine, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, Jun. 25,
1905.
402. FRANK W. BLACKMAR, KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA OF STATE HISTORY EMBRACING
EVENTS, INSTITUTIONS, INDUSTRIES, COUNTIES, CITIES, ToWNS, PROMINENT PER-
SONS, ETC. 145 (1912) (discussing Ottawa's historic connections with the Baptist
Church).
403. Daniel M. Valentine, Spiritual Rapping (on file with the Kansas Collections, Univer-
sity of Kansas Library).
404. "According to the Bible good spirits were often seen on the earth [and] often com-
municated with man, for instance, Samuel, Moses, Elias, Many at the resurrection,
etc. Also evil spirits were on the earth & were permitted to torment man & in the
days of Christ there were from one to seven & even up to legions cast out of human
beings." Id.
405. "[We have an almost infinite number of converging facts to prove that spirits have
been seen on this earth." Id.
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um, we would probably be able to contact these beneficent spiritual be-
. 406ings ourselves.
Valentine was a religiously independent, if not downright hetero-
dox, young man. He was also a Republican, an abolitionist, and a
staunch supporter of Abraham Lincoln. He attended two speeches Lin-
coln delivered in Kansas.40 ' He poked a little fun at Lincoln's style-he
tried too hard to make a joke.40 s But the moral substance of Lincoln's
speech was compelling. He declared that the nation's founders believed
slavery to be a great evil and that the Southern position on the matter
was wrong; Valentine appreciatively took in every word.409
Unlike Horton, who denounced all forms of civil disobedience as
incompatible with democratic order, Valentine remembered the im-
portance of resistance to evil at the time of the Civil War.41 o John Brown
was a hero. Surely, Valentine must have regarded Horton as something
of an amnesiac for forgetting that. Valentine reflected on Brown's Kansas
campaigns in the late 1850s, before he faced his final bloody downfall at
Harper's Ferry in 1859.' Brown had taken up arms against the slave
406. Valentine was quick to dismiss the possibility that mediums might be fakes or charla-
tans. "[I]t is often the most innocent inoffensive little girls who are mediums who
could not deceive anybody" who serve as the most effective mediums. Id. Valentine
also investigated phrenology, the nineteenth-century pseudoscience that maintained
that an individual's intellect and moral character might be discerned through a study
of the bony irregularities of one's skull. NINETEENTH-CENTURY SCIENCE: A SELEC-
TION OF ORIGINAL TEXTs 161 (A.S. Weber ed., 2000). Phrenology, furthermore, had
political significance, "carr[ying] an egalitarian and antihierarchical message." PETER
J. BOWLER & IWAN RHYs MORUS, MAKING MODERN SCIENCE: A HISTO1UCAL SURVEY
388 (2005). As with spiritualism, so also with phrenology, Valentine sought to rec-
oncile this field of inquiry with Christianity: Phrenology was the most sublime of all
pursuits, he wrote, because it investigates the human mind, which "is made in the
image of the Deity and after his own likeness." Daniel M. Valentine, Address on
Phrenology (1852) (on file with the Kansas Collections, University of Kansas Li-
brary).
407. DANIEL MULFORD VALENTINE, POCKET DIARY FOR 1859 (1859, available at http:f/
www.kansasmemory.org/item/2081 4 0/page/ (recording Valentine's observations of
Lincoln's Dec. 3 and Dec. 5, 1859 speeches).
408. Id. ("Do all Kentucky orators try to say something funny?").
409. Id. ( "The Points he touched on were as ably handled as I have ever heard or seen
them handled. I think it as able a speech as I have ever heard. [H]e had a few notes to
look at, the first part of his speech was historical to show that the Fathers of the Re-
public thought Slavery very wrong, [tihe most of his speech was in opposition to
popular sovereignty & those that think Slavery a matter of indifference.").
410. Daniel M. Valentine, Handwritten Essay on John Brown, (unpublished essay) (on
file with the Kansas Collections, University of Kansas Library).
411. After a life spent in Massachusetts and Ohio, Brown moved to Kansas in 1855. He
played a role in the massacre of pro-slavery "border ruffians" in 1856 (the Pottawatomie
Massacre), and fought pitched battles against pro-slavery forces at Palmyra and Osawat-
omie. His daring exploits won for him the adulation of abolitionists throughout the
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power's tyranny and thereby made it clear that slavery was a moral
wrong that needed to be purged from the nation.
For this, Valentine believed Brown was worthy of respect and ven-
eration. Resistance, even violent resistance, was sometimes necessary:
"[Brown] began to form plans for the liberating of the slaves. Bloody
plans, which were accepted by few, but which the genius of Brown alone
saw must be wrought out before the liberty of the slaves would be ac-
complished."' Brown refused to submit even with his capture and his
execution and, "like Samson, his death would be his greatest victory.""'
Valentine's mental universe not only permitted civil disobedience but
made easy the trail to violent revolution.
On the bench, Valentine proved himself an innovator, a bold moral
voice for the most vulnerable classes of citizens. In two crisply-worded
opinions issued six years apart, Valentine carved from the Kansas Con-
stitution a limited right of women's suffrage.4" The Constitution
restricted suffrage in state elections to white males, Valentine conceded,
but local elections, such as school boards, were a different matter-the
Constitution was silent, and here Valentine was able to act. He strongly
believed in the integration of women into political life and thought that
the compromise he forged, worked out through case law, was an im-
portant first step:
There is nothing in the nature of things, or in the nature of
government, which would prevent [female suffrage]. Women
are members of society,-members of the great body politic,
citizens,-as much as men, with the same natural rights, unit-
ed with men in the same common destiny, and are capable of
receiving and exercising whatever of political rights may be
conferred upon them."'
nation. A whole genre of literature grew up in the decades after the Civil War cele-
brating Brown's heroism. See, e.g., JOHN BROWN, LIBERATOR OF KANSAS, MARTYR OF
VIRGINIA (Franklin Benjamin Sanborn ed., 1885). On the construction of this myth,
see generally JANET KEMPER BECK, CREATING THE JOHN BROWN LEGEND: EMERSON,
THOREAU, DOUGLASS, CHILD, AND HIGGINSON IN DEFENSE OF THE RAID ON HAR-
PER'S FERRY (2009).
412. Valentine, supra note 410.
413. Id.
414. Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kan. 26 (1875); Winans v. Williams, 5 Kan. 227 (1869).
415. Wheeler, 15 Kan. at 33. Valentine was also a believer in the integration of women
into the workplace. In a commencement address delivered to a women's college, Val-
entine encouraged women to pursue all the intellectual occupations open to men.
Women should attend college on an equal basis with men. They should pursue train-
ing in "science, literature, and art." They should consider "[a]ll trades, occupations,
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Women, Valentine maintained in another case, should not be
trapped in loveless marriages. As a remedy, he proposed a new ground
for divorce: "mental cruelty." Prior to State v. Walker, the case of Carpen-
ter v. Carpenter might have been the most notorious matrimonial action
on the Kansas frontier."' John Carpenter was one of the most promising
politicians in Kansas-a Civil-War veteran with a sterling record, he
served in the Kansas State Senate, had been appointed by President
Rutherford B. Hayes as Internal Revenue Collector for Kansas, and had
his eyes set on election as Governor." In December, 1882, however,
when he was poised to seize control of his great good fortune, his wife
Eliza tried to destroy him with a series of embarrassing essays she con-
tributed to state newspapers. John, she alleged, had been an adulterer,
and his conduct towards her had been lewd, lascivious, obscene, and
embarrassing. He was unfit, in short, for public trust."" John immedi-
ately responded by filing for divorce, proposing in his action that Eliza
harbored the desire to shipwreck his career and that her vengeful de-
structiveness amounted to "extreme cruelty.""'
"Extreme cruelty" as a grounds for divorce had classically consisted
of acts of outrageous physical abuse. A leading treatise on the law of di-
vorce declared that "[r]he general ground upon which the court
proceeds in these cases is danger to the life or health of the party . . . .
There must be ill treatment and personal injury, or the reasonable ap-
prehension of personal injury.,420 By 1883, a few cases had begun to take
slow and uncertain steps towards expanding the meaning of "extreme
cruelty," but these were tentative, timid half-measures.4 2'
and professions [as] open to them. They may become preachers, lawyers, doctors,
merchants, farmers, carpenters or blacksmiths." Daniel Valentine, Female Education,
TOPEKA COMMONWEALTH, Jun. 17, 1880.
416. Carpenter, 2 P. 122 (Kan. 1883).
417. See Connelley supra note 363;John C Carpenter (1838-1921), THE CHANUTE DAILY
TRIBUNE, May 23, 1921.
418. Carpenter, 2 P. at 128-29.
419. Carpenter, 2 P. at 123.
420. LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAw OF MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE 236 (1841). Chancellor Kent had taken much the same position: "The causes
must be grave and weighty and show such a state of personal danger as that the duties
of the married life cannot be discharged." KENT, supra note 67, at 126. The law had
not changed appreciably in forty years' time. Writing in 1881, Joel Prentiss Bishop
observed that cruelty was "such conduct in one of the married parties as, to the rea-
sonable apprehension of the other, or in fact, renders cohabitation impossible." 1
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
524 (6th ed. 1881).
421. See, e.g., Powelson v. Powelson, 22 Cal. 358, 361 (1863) ("humiliating insults" deliv-
ered with "ingenious malice" might amount to extreme cruelty); McClung v.
McClung, 40 Mich. 493, 496-97 (1879) (adultery amounts to extreme cruelty);
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Valentine, however, was not one for timidity. He began his analysis
by redefining what was meant by marriage. Marriage is not simply the
satisfaction of the sexual urges, but something far loftier: it is "a mental
and spiritual relation as well as a physical relation."4 22 Defined in these
terms, cruelty might be mental as well as physical: "[M]ental suffering
may be much greater than physical suffering. And the treatment Col.
Carpenter received from his wife must have caused him intense suffer-
ing, great anguish of mind and spirit, and inexpressible sorrow."423
While these accomplishments were considerable, Judge Valentine's
most important achievement was his effort-ultimately frustrated by
Kansas politicians-to integrate Kansas schools. African-Americans had
moved to Kansas from the deep South in large numbers in the 1860s
and 1870s, viewing Kansas as a symbol of freedom.424 School districts,
especially in larger cities, responded to this migration by adopting a pol-
icy of racial segregation, establishing separate schools for Whites and
African-Americans.425 In Board of Education v. Tinnon, Valentine had a
126
chance to address this problem. The issue was a complicated one, in-
volving the status of cities of different sizes under Kansas law, and
Valentine, probably because of pressure from other justices, resolved the
question on narrow, statutory grounds.4 27 But he made sure to include in
his opinion a ringing statement of where public policy should be:
Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich. 205, 210 (1868) ("extreme cruelty" not confined to
physical brutality) .
422. Carpenter, 2 P. at 144-45.
423. Carpenter, 2 P. at 145. Carpenter would play a large role in the evolution of the
"mental cruelty" doctrine even decades later. In 1928, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
quoted extensively from Carpenter and praised Valentine by name. Elswick v. Els-
wick, 265 P. 121, 123 (Okla. 1928). The North Dakota Supreme Court based its
test for mental cruelty on Carpenter, Thompson v. Thompson, 156 N.W. 492, 494
(N.D. 1916); see also Nebraska, Berdolt v. Berdolt, 77 N.W. 399, 403 (Neb. 1898);
Washington, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 100 P. 321, 323 (Wash. 1909). The Texas Court
of Civil Appeals quoted from Carpenter as the sounder approach to extreme cruelty
allegations. Dawson v. Dawson, 132 S.W. 379, 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
424. This migration was driven by the Southern States' enactment of Jim Crow legislation
and it reached its peak in the years 1878 and 1879. The migration came to be known
as the Kansas Fever Exodus and is well covered in NELL IRVIN PAINTER, EXODUSTERS:
BLACK MIGRATION To KANSAS AFTER RECONSTRUCTION (1992). See also ROBERT G.
ATHEARN, IN SEARCH OF CANAAN: BLACK MIGRATION To KANSAS, 1879-1880
(1978).
425. James C. Carper, The Popular Ideology of Segregated Schooling: Attitudes Toward the
Education ofBlacks in Kansas, 1854-1900, in 1 KANSAS HIsTORY: A JOURNAL OF THE
CENTRAL PLAINS 254, 255 (1978).
426. See Bd. of Educ. of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
427. State law permitted cities of the "first class" to segregate schools based on race but was
silent about smaller cities of the "second class." Ottawa was a smaller city that had
adopted a policy of segregation. Valentine treated the statute's silence as a failure to
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Is it not better for the grand aggregate of human society, as
well as for individuals, that all children should mingle together
and learn to know each other? At the common schools, where
both sexes and all kinds of children mingle together, we have
the great world in miniature; there they may learn human na-
ture in all its phases, with all its emotions, passions, and
feelings, its loves and hates, its hopes and fears, its impulses
and sensibilities; there they may learn the secret springs of
human actions, and the attractions and repulsions, which lead
with irresistible force to particular lines of conduct.
But on the other hand, persons by isolation may become
strangers even in their own country; and by being strangers,
will be of but little benefit either to themselves or to society.
As a rule, people cannot afford to be ignorant of the society
which surrounds them; and as all kinds of people must live to-
gether in the same society, it would seem better that all should
be taught in the same schools.428
But behind this image of Valentine as the great reformer there was a
private Valentine, a man whose view of human nature was becoming
increasingly darker. In his private meditations, preserved in his journals,
he showed himself as having moved from his early open-mindedness on
matters of faith to become a sin-soaked, damnation-obsessed individual,
preoccupied with the utter depravity of humankind.
Selfishness Controls All Our Actions was the title of his principal re-
flection on this theme."' Selfishness, Valentine asserted, dominates
every aspect of our being. Sexual love is one of its crudest, grossest
manifestations. We love because we want to possess, own, entirely
dominate another human being. A woman is beautiful and comely; she
has attractive features, she flirts. And the man's response is pure and
simple savagery:
authorize Ottawa's action, ruling it ultra vires. See Karl A. Cole-Frieman, The Ghosts
of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka Kansas: A Case Study on the Role of the Federal Courts
in School Desegregation, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 25 (1996).
428. Tinnon, 26 Kan. at 19. David Brewer, the future United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice, then a justice on the Kansas Supreme Court, wrote an impassioned dissent.
Valentine did not commit himself on the role of the Fourteenth Amendment in
school desegregation, and Brewer wanted it made clear that separate-but-equal should
be good law: "I dissent entirely from the suggestion that under the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution, the state has no power to provide for separate
schools for white and colored children." Id. at 23 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
429. Daniel Valentine, Selfishness Controls All Our Actions (May 1861) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Kansas Collection, University of Kansas Libraries).
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I wish to satiate my burning passion. . . . I would take her.
from a palace to dwell . . . with me in a hovel. I would take
from her all the luxury of a happy home always provided with
all the excesses of life to live with me in indigence and want. I
would take her from the smiling faces of friends to dwell with
strangers or to be a wanderer with me upon the face of the
earth.... If I could, I would seek and consummate ... her ru-
in. I would seduce her and then leave her to drag out her
miserable life in infamy and disgrace, or I would do even
worse than this." 3 o
It was clear to Valentine that men had no allegiance to the women
they violated in this way: "Should I see another woman who possessed
greater charms, or was more capable of conducing to my happiness, and
I thought I could obtain this second lady, why I would discard the first
as quick as the child would throw away his old toy when . . . he could
obtain a new one that pleased him better."431 Do not think yourself im-
mune to this debased desire, Valentine cautioned. Look at the Bible:
Abraham "committed fornication and adultery;"432 "King David com-
mitted Polygamy and Adultery."43 3 He went so far as to arrange the
death of a rival to secure the beautiful Bathsheba for his wife.434 "King
Solomon was a polygamist and a libertine." 435
Do not for a minute think yourself remotely the equal of one of
these patriarchs or kings, cautioned Valentine. Your self-control is much
reduced, your sinful impulses even more degraded. It is selfishness all
the way down: "[N]o man cares for any woman.",36 This selfishness even
extended to the worship of God. It is the fear of Hell, on the one hand,
and the desire to grab for oneself all of the happiness and prosperity of
everlasting life, that motivate us in all of our so-called acts of religious
worship. We do not really care for God aside from the fact that He sits
431
in terrible judgment over us.
Laws matter not, Valentine sighed, but strict laws at least have the
chance of restraining the most wicked among us. "[W]hen men are un-
restrained by laws, when the change of wives or mistresses is unattended
430. Id. at 3-4.
431. Id. at 4-5.
432. Id. at 6.
433. Id
434. Id. at 8.
435. Id. at 6.
436. Id. at 8-9.
437. Id. at 25.
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with any great expense or trouble, we find that men very frequently
change their wives and mistresses.
The question, of course, was which Valentine would be judging the
case?
G. Judgment Day
Oral argument was had on January 7, 1887. David Overmyer pas-
sionately made the case that the parties were legally and morally
married: They did not couple for lust, but out of a desire to form a last-
ing, loving relationship. Their proper motives can be discerned from
their effort to assemble family and friends as witnesses, and from the
seriousness with which they exchanged their promises.439 "Does a man
promise in the presence of his mother and witnesses to be faithful in
lust?" Overmyer asked the Court.440 "No, ten thousand times NO!"
came his thundering reply."' Overmyer went on to try to reconcile Kan-
sas' marriage statutes with common-law marriage and to assert that the
Edwin and Lillian's union should at least count as a valid common-law
442marriage.
The papers did not report on Gilluly and Bradford's side of the
case. Undoubtedly, they were less interesting and entertaining. But it is
probable that they asserted that it was impossible to understand Edwin
and Lillian's marriage apart from the larger Lucifer project on behalf of
free love. They might have gone on to assert that marital love was not-
and could not be-free love. Parties could not jettison their partners for
someone who struck them as more attractive, or more promising as a
bread-winner, or more pleasurable, or richer, or healthier, or younger, or
stronger. Marriage, they might have insisted, was a life-long publicly-
made commitment whose bonds might be severed for only the gravest
of reasons. Any dissent from this point of view, they doubtless would
have claimed, ran the risk of bringing civil anarchy to Kansas.
The Court took its time in rendering its judgment. Moses and his
followers waited with anticipation. All of the excitement had actually
438. Id. at 5. "Fornication, seduction, prostitution, libertinism, polygamy, adultery, incest
[and] rape," all of these practices would be much commoner were "there not strin-
gent laws against all these offenses." Id.
439. David Overmyer, In the Supreme Court of Kansas, LucIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Jan.
28, 1887, at 1.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. The Free Lovers, TOPEKA DAILY COMMONWEALTH, Jan. 8, 1887.
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driven sales of Lucifer, tripling subscriptions from the previous August.443
But this was not some publicity stunt designed to boost revenue. It was
a serious test case striking at the heart of what it meant to marry.
The Kansas Supreme Court ended the suspense on March 4, 1887,
when it announced its judgment. The youngest justice, William Agnew
Johnston, spoke first. After carefully reviewing the language of the statute,
Johnston declared that its dominant purpose was to ensure that every
legitimate union in the state be properly publicized and recorded. And,
Johnston insisted, this meant that individuals could be punished for
failing to obtain a license in accord with the statute.
This did not mean that the statute abolished common-law mar-
riage.45 Pates might still marry one another validly without observing
the appropriate statutory forms, but in doing so they had to be aware that
they were in violation of the licensing norms.4 6 The logic of this position
is that one might be married yet still be found guilty of failing to marry in
the appropriate way. 1 In a casual throwaway line, Johnston wrote that
"we are not prepared to say that the contract between the defendants is a
common-law marriage."448 This statement was delivered without analysis
or reasoning, intended really as judicial fiat. Judge Crozier's confused jury
instructions now made their way into case law.449
Albert Howell Horton followed. Like Johnston, Horton asserted
that "persons who marry without conforming to the statutory regula-
tions, may be punished, although the marriage itself be valid."so Horton
did a better job than Johnston in explaining why this should be so:
Children have an interest in the certainty of their parents' marriages, as
443. JOANNE E. PASSET, SEX RADICALS AND THE QUEST FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 136
(2003).
444. State v. Walker, 13 P. 279, 283 (Kan. 1887) ("It is palpable that the leading idea and
purpose of this act is to compel publicity, and to require a record be made of the
marriages contracted in Kansas.").
445. Walker, 13 P. at 284.
446. Walker, 13 P. at 284.
447. Johnston tried to blunt the logical inconsistency here by attempting to limit com-
mon-law marriage to a particular set of facts: irregular unions of long duration that
produce offspring whom the Court now wishes to protect. Walker, 13 P. at 284. Of
course, common-law marriage could not be so limited. In theory, it came into being
where two parties exchanged present-tense consent to be married (verba depraesen-
ti, to use language first given shape in medieval canon law and that survived into
the twentieth century). See OTTo E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 105-34 (1922) (demonstrating verba de
praesenti-consent in the present-tense-remained the defining element of com-
mon-law marriage into the 1920s).
448. Walker, 13 P. at 284.
449. See supra notes 238-55 and accompanying text.
450. Walker, 13 P. at 286 (Horton, C.J., concurring).
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do heirs."' Furthermore, unsuspecting women and men are both pro-
tected by the statute. Without proper record-keeping, "the woman is
placed at the mercy of the man, who may deny the 'consensual relation'
and repudiate her; and, on the other hand, a man may be blackmailed
by an adventuress, who may declare there was a 'consensual marriage'
,,452
when there was none.
Horton took pains to dismiss Edwin and Lillian's freedom-of-
conscience claims. He maintained that in enacting this statute, Kansas
was doing nothing more than performing routine record-keeping, just as
it does with real-estate conveyances and other commercial contracts.
"I cannot understand how the provisions of the statute can be truthfully
denounced as a 'monstrosity,' or in what way the 'sacred liberty' or the
'personal rights' of the parties are infringed.""' Women enjoyed all sorts
of liberty in Kansas, and Horton was perplexed that anyone would
455doubt this was so.
Valentine was last. Unlike Johnston and Horton, he was willing to
address foundational issues. Indeed, Valentine's entire opinion was phil-
osophical in tone and purpose and did not cite a single legal authority,
case, or statute. He began with the exchange of promises. Their state-
ments exchanged with such solemnity on that September Sunday
afternoon, failed to make a marriage:
In the present case, the parties repudiated nearly everything
essential to a valid marriage, and openly avowed this
repudiation at the commencement of their union. They
avowed, among other things, that they would not be governed
by the laws of the state or of society upon this subject, but
451. See Walker, 13 P. at 286.
452. Walker, 13 P. at 286.
453. Walker, 13 P. at 287.
454. Walker, 13 P. at 287.
455. Walker, 13 P. at 288. It can only be imagined how Moses, Lillian, and Edwin reacted
upon reading the following self-congratulation:
[I]n Kansas, a woman, in nearly all matters, is accorded civil and political
equality with man. She is not his servant or his slave. Here the sexes may
harmonize in opinion, and co-operate in effort; here woman is no longer
subordinate to man, but the two are co-ordinate together; here the burden
of a common prejudice and a common ignorance against woman has been
wholly removed; here the tyranny which degrades and crushes the wives
and mothers in other countries no longer exists; here the coveted rewards
of life, forever forbidden them in some of the states, are within their reach;
here a fair field for their genius and industry is open, and womanhood,
with the approbation of all, may assert its divinely chartered rights, and ful-
fill its noblest duties. Id
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would be governed only by their own notions of right and
propriety. They announced in effect that they "repudiated all
powers legally conferred upon husbands and wives" and that
they "are opposed to the making of promises," and that both
were to remain free, as before their union; and they did not
make the necessary and essential promises to constitute them
husband and wife."
Valentine had a clear conception of marriage and he was not afraid
to conclude that Edwin and Lillian failed to measure up:
[T]hey lived together, but had no intention of creating that re-
lation or status known and defined by law and by the customs
and usages of all civilized society as marriage. This living to-
gether in such circumstances did not in the law constitute a
457valid marriage.
Valentine was unsparing: "In my opinion, the union between E.C.
Walker and Lillian Harman was no marriage, and they deserve all the
punishment which has been inflicted upon them.""'
CONCLUSION
"Technically," Lucifer the Light-Bearer editorialized upon receiving
word of the opinion, "we have lost, but substantially we have won a
great victory.""59 In truth, this might have seemed like wishful thinking
at the time. Moses Harman had already been placed under arrest for
460
violations of the federal Comstock Act,4s and Anthony Comstock
would pursue him relentlessly nearly to the grave." Lillian and Edwin
456. Walker, 13 P. at 288 (Valentine, J., concurring).
457. Walker, 13 P. at 289.
458. Walker, 13 P. at 289.
459. At Last, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Mar. 11, 1887, at 2.
460. Moses Harman, Comstock in the West, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER, Mar. 25, 1887,
at 1-2 (writing about his arrest earlier that month).
461. Id. Moses Harman was arrested for the last time in 1905 in Chicago. Moses Harman
provides a brief account of this arrest and prosecution in an article entitled Lucifer
and the Obscenity Laws, found in a pamphlet entitled THE PERSECUTION AND THE
APPRECIATION: BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TRIALs AND IMPRISONMENT OF MOSES
HARMAN 34, 42-46 (1907). Following conviction, Moses was confined from Febru-
ary to June 1906 at the penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, where he was put to work at
"hard labor." Id. at 42. He was transferred in June, 1906, to the federal prison at
Leavenworth, Kansas, where he spent most of the remainder of his confinement re-
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had spent six months of their lives in jail seemingly for naught, although
Moses' arrest at least gave them the excuse to pay court costs and gain
their release.462 Only in this way could they assure Lucifer's continued
publication. Routed and scattered-this surely would be a more plausi-
ble way of understanding their situation in the spring of 1887.
So, was Lucifer's editorial-writer delusional in proclaiming victory?
Perhaps not. Admittedly, marriage, during much of the twentieth centu-
ry, remained tightly regulated by the state. But as the scholarship cited
in the introduction suggests, that primacy has been called into serious
doubt.6 We live in a pluralistic age, a time in which people of greatly
differing value systems may wish to define the attributes of married life
for themselves. Maybe marriage needs to be abolished, ' or perhaps in-
stead of a single, one-size-fits-all marriage, we need multiple forms of
marriage to accommodate vastly differing understandings."' Whenever
we raise these questions seriously, we are reopening Edwin and Lillian's
claims in State v. Walker.
And what of the claims made by Lillian, by Moses, and by their
correspondents, that women must enjoy autonomy over the reproduc-
tive processes? This was, for Moses, the "Pivotal Issue" on which the
entire case turned.6 A review of the United States Supreme Court's con-
traception and abortion decisions of the last forty years is testimony of
the extent to which this perspective on human sexuality and reproduc-
tion has now prevailed. 1
Finally, the method Moses, Lillian, and Edwin pioneered for raising
these claims-the deliberately-designed test case brought to maximize
cuperating in the prison hospital. Id. at 42-43. He was released in December, 1906.
Id. at 43.
462. Edwin C. Walker & Lillian Harman, Past and Present, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER,
Apr. 8, 1887, at2.
463. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
464. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, "Defending" Marriage: A Modest Proposal, 41 How. L. J.
215 (1998) (proposing hypothetically that religious marriage outside the norms of
law should enjoy favor); June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose What Constitutes Family:
Oxymoron or Basic Right? I lus GENTIUM 11 (2007) (considering whether autonomy
should trump the need for state regulation of marriage).
465. See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences From New York and
Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 135(2007).
466. State v. Walker, 13 P. 279, 280 (Kan. 1887), and accompanying text. 146 Moses
Harman, The Main Issue, LUCIFER THE LIGHT-BEARER (Jan. 28, 1887) (capitalized in
original).
467. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (declaring
unconstitutional a paternal notification requirement); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a statute requiring the fa-
ther to consent to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing
an individual right of privacy of the woman to obtain birth control).
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their challenge to the status quo-became standard operating procedure
during the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. The free-speech
movement, the civil rights movement, the labor movement, the anti-war
movement of the 1960's and 70's-all of these grand efforts at social
change featured many cases that involved the deliberate violation of law
468
in order to bring into question unjust political and legal arrangements.
In all of these respects it is not really far-fetched to call the outcome
a "great victory." t
468. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (arising from Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King's arrest for leading a Good Friday parade in Birmingham without a
permit-which later led to Dr. King writing his Letter From Birminghamjail).
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